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ABSTRACT
SWING VOTERS?
ROMAN CATHOLICS FROM 1992 TO 2004
By
Lori Gula Wright
University of New Hampshire, December, 2006

This thesis evaluates whether Catholics are swing voters, how their voting
behavior has changed from 1992 to 2004, and what issues are influencing their
voting behavior. National Election Survey datasets from 1992, 1996, 2000 and
2004 are used. Two models are evaluated, the ethnoreligious model and the
culture wars thesis. In addition, this thesis looks at whether Catholics tend to be
single-issue voters.
The research and analysis of this thesis support the conclusion that
Catholics are not swing voters and that their voting patterns are more similar to
the general electorate than ever before. Although religious, class and cultural
issues have significantly influenced Catholic voting behavior, they also have
significantly influenced non-Catholic voting behavior in similar ways. While the
“Catholic Vote” may once have been a significant factor in electoral politics, today
Catholics are more likely to vote like the rest of the country than ever before.

viii
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INTRODUCTION
In the 2004 presidential election, pollsters and political pundits pointed to the
increasingly important role of religion in influencing voting behavior, citing it as a
key reason why Republican President George W. Bush was re-elected by a
majority of the voters. Pollsters have found that religious commitment is a
primary indicator of voting behavior, stronger than education, gender, or income.1
Roman Catholics played an important part in Bush’s victory; overall, Roman
Catholics voted 52 to 47 percent for Bush, rejecting Catholic Democrat John
Kerry.2 Just 12 years before in 1992, however, Catholics opted for Democrat Bill
Clinton over Republican George H.W. Bush, providing Clinton a 9-percentage
point margin over Bush.3 In the four election cycles since 1992, the majority of
Catholics have twice voted for a Democratic presidential candidate and twice for
a Republican presidential candidate. These swings in support between
Democratic and Republican presidential candidates have prompted media and
political pundits to declare Catholics the most significant swing voters in
American electoral politics today.4 While research on swing voters is limited,
scholars studying these voters have found that 25 percent of Americans are
swing voters and in close national elections, they decide who is elected

1 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign,” American Behavioral Scientist,
September 2005, 49:1, p. 11
2 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Burn Politics of the 2004
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
3 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p.
314.
4 Breyfogle, Todd, “Some Paradoxes of Religion in the 2000 Presidential Election,” Stateside,
2001, p. 545.

1

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

president.5 And Catholics have constituted a greater portion of swing voters since
1980.6
Catholics appear to have moved away from their strong historical
ethnoreligious ties to the Democratic Party. According to a study by The Pew
Forum on Religion and Public Life, Catholics who considered themselves
Democrats dropped from 71 percent to 44 percent between 1960 and 2004.7
However, scholars suggest that since 1992 many denominations, including
Catholics, have been experiencing a growing divide between traditional and
modernist believers based on cultural issues. Known generally as the “religion
gap,”8 scholars it has been growing substantially since 1992, fueled in large part
by the increasingly sophisticated operations of the Religious Right and their
messages of moral and family values.
The 2004 election may have been one of most clear examples of the
religious divide for Catholics. While John F. Kennedy may have been too
Catholic for the nation in 1960, pundits quipped in 2004 that John Kerry may not
have been Catholic enough.9 Traditionalist Catholics who had previously favored
government-run social programs now opted for private sector efforts and the

5 Shaw, Daron, “Swing Voting and U.S. Presidential Elections,” 2006, p. 23. Presented June 10,
2006, at the Northeastern University conference, “The Swing Voter in American Politics,” Boston,
Mass.
6 Mayer, William G., “The Swing Voter In American Presidential Elections: An Initial Inquiry,”
2006, pp. 30-31. Presented June 10, 2006, at the Northeastern University conference, “The
Swing Voter in American Politics,” Boston, Mass.
7 Morton, Heather, ed., “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Partisan Divide,” The Pew Forum
on Religion and Public Life, Trends 2005, p. 31.
8 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 70.
9 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Bum Politics of the 2004
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
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social ideas of Republican candidates.10 Modernist Catholics who held more
liberal views on cultural issues such as gay marriage and abortion rights found
more to like about Kerry, a supporter of civil unions for gay couples and abortion
rights. Kerry’s Catholic faith, however, was not enough to convince a substantial
portion of conservative and centrist Catholics to vote for him.11
Yet while the majority of Catholics rejected the first President Bush and
supported the second President Bush, it would be inaccurate to categorize
Catholics now as majority Republican. In fact, their shift in support away from
Democratic candidates appears to indicate that they have no political home. Are
the pollsters and political pundits correct? Are Catholics swing voters? What are
the issues that are impacting their voting behavior?
This study attempts to determine whether Catholics are swing voters in
American electoral politics, and if so, how their voting behavior has changed from
1992 to 2004.1will assess the relationship between religion and voting behavior
for Catholics by looking at National Election Survey data for the period from 1992
to 2004. Traditionally, the ethnoreligious model - ethnic, denominational and
communal ties that strongly define a partisan alignment - has been a strong
predictor of voting behavior.12 This study will assess whether the ethnoreligious
model remains a strong predictor of Catholic voting behavior, or whether there a
new alignment has developed tied to religiosity fueled by cultural issues. Known

10 Kapp, Lawrence, “The Political Values and Voting Behavior of American Catholics: Changes
and Continuities from 1984 to 1998,” Ph.D. Dissertation, Catholic University, 1999.
11 Sabato, Larry J., Divided States of America: The Slash and Bum Politics of the 2004
Presidential Election, Pearson Longman, 2006, p. 224.
12 Guth, James L., Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Smidt, Corwin E., “America Fifty/Fifty,”
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Issue 116, October 2001, p. 19.
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as the culture wars thesis13, this new an alignment differs from the ethnoreligious
model because it identifies voting patterns according to a person’s level of
commitment to his religion, regardless of denomination. Finally, this study will
look at whether Catholics are becoming single-issue voters on such issues as
abortion and gay rights.
I have divided this thesis in to five sections. In the first section, I will
discuss recent voting behavior of Catholics in America, looking at the period from
1972 to 2004.1have chosen this period because scholars have said that the first
indications of a culture war and a religion gap occurred in 1972 with the election
of Republican Richard Nixon.14 In the second section, I will review what scholars
have said about the relationship between religion and voting behavior regarding
two primary models, the ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis. After
explaining the operationalization and measurement used in this study, I will
review my hypotheses and then present the results of my analyses to see what
factors influenced Catholic voting behavior from 1992 to 2004. Finally, I will
discuss my results broadly, providing insight about Catholic voting trends. I will
use National Election Study data sets from 1992, 1996, 2000 and 2004 in my
analyses.

13 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 68.
14 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign," American Behavioral
Scientist, September 2005, 49:1, p. 12.
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CHAPTER I

CATHOLIC VOTERS IN AMERICA

Why study the relationship between religion and voting behavior for
American Catholics? Simply, religion is a critical element in American culture. It
provides guidance regarding how people should relate to each other, defines
appropriate norms of behavior, and identifies unacceptable conduct.15 A majority
of Americans see religion as being analogous to morality, the perceived lack of
which has been an issue that has been growing in importance for many years.
According to Himmelfarb, “for decades Americans ... have been telling pollsters
that the country is experiencing a ‘moral crisis,’ or at the very least, a ‘major
moral problem,’ reflected ... in a decline of civility, respect, responsibility and
family stability. It is this sense of moral crisis or disarray that makes Americans,
even nonobservant ones, so solicitous of religion.”16 And as the largest
denomination in the nation representing approximately 25 percent of Americans,
17 Catholics play an important role in American society and even more so in
electoral politics if they are, indeed, swing voters. Therefore, they will be the
focus of this study.
15 Leege, David C., “Religion and Politics in Theoretical Perspective,” in Rediscovering the
Religious Factor in American Politics, p. 8, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E
Sharpe: New York, 1993.
16 Himmelfarb, Gertrude, “Religion in the 2000 Election,” Public Interest, Spring 2001, Issue 143.
17 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,”
Trends 2005, January 2005, p. 13.
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Cultural Issues Begin To Emerge
Historically Americans voted along denominational, or ethnoreligious lines,
with Protestants voting for Republican candidates and Catholics, Jews and other
religious minorities supporting Democratic candidates. Scholars note that these
ethnoreligious alignments from the mid-20th century were so strong that they held
beyond the New Deal’s class politics that pitted more affluent Americans against
less affluent, industrial working class Americans.18 Catholic support for
Democratic presidential candidates was consistent during the period, except
when Catholics overwhelming backed Democratic John F. Kennedy in I960.19
However after 1960, the Catholics’ traditionally strong support for Democratic
candidates began to wane.20 As the country moved into the turbulent social and
cultural period of 1960s and 1970s, and as Catholics became more educated
and affluent, the Catholic-Protestant tensions of the 19th and 20th centuries began
to ease. In its place were the beginnings of what many scholars say was a new
framework for religion and voting behavior based on “conflict within religious
traditions over belief, practice and the role of religion in society.”21 The culture
war, both in society and within the Catholic Church, seemed to have begun.
Within the church, 1968 marked a defining moment for Catholics with the
publication of the encyclical Humanae Vitae, in which the Vatican declared the
use of artificial birth control a moral sin. Not only did many parishioners feel the

18 Guth, James L., Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Smidt, Corwin E., “America Fifty/Fifty,”
First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and Public Life, Issue 116, October 2001, p. 19.
19 Manza, Jeff, and Brooks, Clem, “The Religious Factor in U.S. Elections, 1960-1992," The
American Journal of Sociology, July 1997, 103:1, p. 39, p. 72.
20 Guth, et. al„ p. 20.
21 Manza and Brooks, July 1997, p. 72.
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Vatican was out of touch with the modern issues of Catholics regarding family
planning, the encyclical came just six years after the sweeping changes
recommended in the Second Vatican Council.22 Expectations were high among
the laity that the church was about to change its policy on birth control, especially
after the pope had created a papal commission in 1962 to reexamine the
church’s policy on the issue 23 The commission’s report, released in 1967, was
divided on the issue, with the minority opinion in line with Humanae Vitae. The
report drew an immediate reaction from liberal theologians and the clergy, and by
1977, 73 percent of Catholics supported the use of artificial birth control.24 “For
the first time in American Catholic history, American Catholics publicly resisted
an official church teaching.”25
Outside of the church, the 1972 presidential election marked a watershed
moment in Catholic voting behavior. Republican Richard Nixon won 53 percent of
the Catholic vote, and for the first time, Gallup reported that a majority of Catholic
voters chose a Republican presidential candidate.26 Nixon had courted Catholic
voters, who found comfort in Nixon’s message of support for parochial schools,
which were facing closure across the nation because of rising costs and a
decline in urban enrollments. Prior to the 1972 election, the White House staffer
Ron Morey proposed cutting federal aid for parochial schools, fearing that if he
did not, he would alienate Protestants and public school teachers. Morey

22 Carey, Patrick, Catholics in America, Praeger: Westport, CT, 2004, p. 131.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, p. 132.
25 Ibid.
26 Prendergast, William B., The Catholic Voter in America, Georgetown University Press,
Washington, D.C., 1999, p. 157.
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underestimated the Catholic response, which overwhelming supported aid to
parochial schools (70 percent of Catholics polled by Gallup in 1972 favored
aid.)27 Concern in the White House over the Catholic reactions to Morey’s
proposal reached the highest level: the Republican Party Platform of 1972 made
crystal clear Nixon’s support for aid to parochial schools, and Nixon himself told
the Knights of Columbus, “In our fight to save your schools, you can count on my
support.”28
The legalization of abortion in 1973 further impacted the relationship
between religion and Catholic voting behavior, as well as the relationship
between the laity and church leaders. Of all the religious traditions, Catholics
were the most vocal opponents of Roe v. Wade, both before and immediately
after the decision.29 Conservative lay Catholics supported their bishops who now
publicly entered the political ring with more vigor than before with the goal to
amend the U.S. Constitution.30 Shaken by the sweeping nature of Roe, which
authorized abortions up to the first six months of gestation of a fetus,
conservative Catholics “agreed with the bishops that the court’s ruling violated
the fundamental value attached to individual human life no only by Catholicism
but by the entire Judeo-Christian tradition, and indeed by most forms of Western
humanism.”31 More liberal members of the clergy and the laity, however, saw the
issue as one of women’s rights and openly disagreed with the church on the

27 Prendergast, p. 160.
28 Prendergast, pp. 160-161.
29
Martin, William, With God on Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America, Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group: New York, 1996, p 193.
30 Prendergast, p. 170.
31 Reichley, p. 274.
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issue.32 No other issue has so divided the Catholic Church as the abortion
issue.33
Though opposed to abortion, evangelical and fundamentalist Protestants
remained quiet relative to Catholics.34 However, that low profile would not last for
long and would, in fact, become the impetus for the birth of the Religious Right,
which would have a significant effect on shaping public discussions about
morality and cultural issues important to Catholics. Concerns about the
Protestant response to the abortion issue as well as the increasing numbers of
abortions resulted in the creation of a five-part film and companion book,
Whatever Happened to the Human Race? 35 The film and book had a dramatic
impact on evangelicals and conservative Christians, and their leaders sensed an
opportunity to draw together conservatives of all faiths, including Catholics, on a
number of issues such as abortion, pornography, education, traditional biblical
moral values, and quotas.
Fundamentalist leaders and secular conservatives ramped up their
strategizing in the late 1970s.36 In 1978 when President Jimmy Carter changed
the tax-exempt status of church-run schools requiring them to accept a certain
percentage of students from racial minorities, the issue brought together powerful
national evangelists such as Jerry Falwell, Pat Robertson and Jim Bakker under

32 Carey, p. 134.
33 Ibid, p. 133.
3 4 ....
Ibid.
35 Martin, p 193.
36 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p.
296.
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one organization, the Moral Majority.37 The organization sought to align people of
all faiths under one body with the goal of “returning the United States to moral
sanity.”38 Other conservative religious groups focused on specific issues also
formed, and in an effort to build a cohesive voting bloc, the groups formed a
network of like-minded leaders who served in leadership roles within each other’s
organizations, both religious and secular. The unifying theme was a pro-family,
traditional Judeo-Christian values plank.39 The Religious Right was born.
The Religious Rights campaigned hard for Republican Ronald Reagan in
1980, and stood behind him again 1984, more active and effective than ever
before.40 Reagan’s message went over particularly well with Catholics, who
made up a substantial portion of so-called Reagan Democrats — conservative on
moral issues and drawn to Reagan’s emphasis on traditional values and
patriotism 41 In 1980, Reagan ran 7 percentage points ahead of his Democratic
challenger among Catholic voters; in 1984, he increased that margin to 11
percentage points.42 Reagan Democrats typically were blue-collar workers who
increasingly felt alienated by the liberal stands and policies - anti-Vietnam,
school busing, pro-choice on abortion, higher taxes, anti-school prayer - of the
Democratic Party 43 For many traditionally Democratic voting blue-collar
Catholics, the Great Communicator was someone who not only spoke to the
37 Ibid, p. 297.
38 Ibid, p. 298.
39
Wald, Kenneth D., Religion and Politics in the United States, Rowman and Littlefield
Publishers, Oxford, England, 2003, p. 210.
40 Ibid, p. 302.
41
“Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,” Trends 2005, The Pew Forum on Religion
and Public Life, January 2005, p. 7.
42 Reichey, p. 281-282.
43 Page, Susan, “Reagan’s revolution reshaped political landscape,” USA Today, 7 June 2004, p.
18a.
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language of the every man, but restored their faith in America as a great, Godgiven nation and supported the social teachings of the church. “Reagan staked
out a position on the conservative side of the cultural divide on abortion,
pornography, prayer in school, school choice and punishment of criminals.”44
Republicans anticipated that a successful effort to draw working-class Catholic
voters to Reagan employing morality issues could be the “Achilles’ heel of the
liberal Democrats.”45
Indeed, in 1984 18 New England bishops said abortion was “the critical
issue of the moment,” and Cardinal John O’Connor of New York said he couldn’t
understand how any Catholic could vote for a candidate who was pro-choice.46 At
the same time, more liberal Catholics were increasingly becoming concerned that
a large portion of the flock were becoming single-issue voters on abortion, to the
detriment of those laity who felt caught in the middle 47 Even 20 years later,
single-issue Catholic voters on abortion still generated concern. According to
John Langan, the Joseph Cardinal Bernardin Professor of Catholic Social
Thought at Georgetown University, “single-issue voting may well be an admirable
expression of conscientious conviction about an important matter, but it should
not be imposed on voters as a requirement of conscience. Both voters and
politicians have to make up their own minds about what issues are opportune,
what fights can be won, what results can be achieved.”48

44 Prendergast, p. 177.
45 Reichey, pp. 280-281.
46 Prendergast, p. 189.
47 Reichley, p. 275.
48 Langan, John, “Observations on Abortion and Politics,” America, 191:12, 25 October 2005.
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The significance of the traditionalist-modernist disputes of the late 20th
century should not be minimized; scholars believe it played an important part in
restructuring the larger American religious traditions, modifying their distinct
cultures. Voters with more traditional religious beliefs found more in common with
other traditionalists of other denominations than they did with less traditional
believers of their own faith.49 By the late 1980s, evidence of this restructuring
began appearing in political polling results, and by the early 1990s, the new
framework based on religiosity, not ethnoreligious ties, appeared to be in place.50
Like other major denominations, Catholics experienced a realignment during this
period, shifting their support away from Democratic candidates. “This election
(1980) has been called the election Watergate postponed, and there are grounds
for the belief that, along with other elements of the population, many Catholics
returned to a track toward Republicanism on which they had been traveling for at
least a decade.”51
1990s: “Moral Crisis” Creates “Religion Gap”
By 1992, scholars declared that a “moral crisis” in the country had created
a “religion gap” — Americans had begun incorporating their political beliefs into
their religious lives based on their religious commitment and activity.52 Social
issues were seen as indicators of moral behavior becoming part of a wider
cultural debate. The religion gap on issues of morality - prayer in school,

49 Guth, et. al„ p. 20.
50 Green, John, C., and Guth, James L, “From Lambs to Sheep: Denominational Change and
Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 100-117, ed.
David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993, p. 100.
51 Prendergasat, p. 185.
52 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 70.
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abortion, homosexuality, gay marriage - had forced the more religiously
observant into one corner and the more secular into another.53 According to
Green, “Once social issues came to the forefront - abortion, gay rights, women’s
rights - it generated differences based on religious attendance. The more
observant people tend to have more traditional family values, and they moved in
a more conservative direction because of those issues.”54
The most common measurement of the religion gap is frequency of church
attendance. Prior to 1972 there was no religion gap, with church attendance
having no bearing on voting behavior — church-going Americans voted in the
same patterns as their non-church-going neighbors.55 From 1972 to 1992, the
gap was small after Republican President Richard Nixon appealed to
traditionalists as the “silent majority,” many of whom he considered Catholics.56
Since 1992, however, the religion gap has continued widen, particularly in
Clinton’s second term, and by 2004, church attendance was one of the strongest
predictors of candidate choice.57 Also called a secular realignment, this
restructuring “reflected the increased ideological polarization of the two major
parties and fundamental changes in public perceptions of the parties during this
period.”58

53 “Religion and Public Life: A Faith-Based Divide,” Trends 2005, The Pew Forum on Religion and
Public Life, January 2005, p. 5.
54 “Churchgoing closely tied to voting patterns,” USA Today, June 3, 2004.
55 Denton, Robert E. Jr., “Religion and the Presidential Campaign,” American Behavioral
Scientist, September 2005, 49:1, p. 12.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid, p. 26.
58 Abramowitz, Alan I., and Saunders, Kyle L., “Ideological Realignment in the U.S. Electorate,”
The Journal of Politics, 60:3, August 1998, p. 636.
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As the morality battles raged, more and more Americans began identifying
themselves as seculars. According to Hout and Fischer, from 1991 to 1998,
adults who said in polls that they prefer no religion increased from 7 percent to
14 percent.59 Scholars attribute this shift to a number of possible factors,
including that polls were reflecting religious attitudes of a new generation of
voters who were less likely to be raised in a religious tradition and were more
liberal or moderate in their beliefs. In addition, scholars believe that the intensity
of religious conservatives taking strong stands on issues of morality during this
period generated a sort of religious backlash, pushing moderate and liberals into
the secular camp. “Had religion not become so politicized, these people would
have gone on identifying as they had been and percentage of Americans
preferring no religion would have risen only 3 or 4 percentage points.”60
The 1992 presidential platforms of the Democratic and Republican parties
reflected the growing religious gap, or secularization of America, by taking their
most polarizing stands on cultural and social issues, such as abortion, gay rights
and women’s rights. The Republican platform, in particular, heavily advocated
traditional family and Judeo-Christian values. “It devoted considerable attention
to cultural matters and was arguably the most morally and religiously
conservative platform produced by a political party in this century.”61
According to the 1992 Republican Party Platform62:

59 Hout, Michael, and Fischer, Claude S., “Why More Americans Have No Religious Preference:
Politics and Generations,” American Sociological Review, 67, April 2002, p. 165.
60 Ibid.
61 Layman, p. 120.
62 Republican Party Platform of 1992, The Vision Shared: The Republican Platform, Uniting Our
Family, Our Country, Our World,” 17 August 1992. Accessed online 10 March 2006 at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=R1992
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The culture of our Nation has traditionally supported those pillars on which
civilized society is built: personal responsibility, morality, and the family.
Today, however, these pillars are under assault. Elements within the
media, the entertainment industry, academia, and the Democrat Party are
waging a guerrilla war against American values. They deny personal
responsibility, disparage traditional morality, denigrate religion, and
promote hostility toward the family's way of life. Children, the members of
our society most vulnerable to cultural influences, are barraged with
violence and promiscuity, encouraging reckless and irresponsible
behavior. This undermines the authority of parents, the ones most
responsible for passing on to their offspring a sense of right and wrong.
The lesson our Party draws is important—that all of us, individuals and
corporations alike, have a responsibility to reflect the values we expect our
fellow citizens to exhibit. And if children grow to adulthood reflecting not
the values of their parents but the amorality with which they are
bombarded, those who send such messages cannot duck culpability.
We also stand united with those private organizations, such as the Boy
Scouts of America, who are defending decency in fulfillment of their own
moral responsibilities. We reject the irresponsible position of those
corporations that have cut off contributions to such organizations because
of their courageous stand for family values. Moreover, we oppose efforts
by the Democrat Party to include sexual preference as a protected
minority receiving preferential status under civil rights statutes at the
federal, State, and local level.
We oppose any legislation or law which legally recognizes same-sex
marriages and allows such couples to adopt children or provide foster
care.
In contrast, the 1992 Democratic Party Platform63 says:
We don’t have an American to waste. Democrats will continue to lead the
fight to ensure that no Americans suffer discrimination or deprivation of
rights on the basis of race, gender, language, national origin, religion, age,
disability, sexual orientation, or other characteristics irrelevant to ability.
We support the ratification of the Equal Rights Amendment; affirmative
action; stronger protection of voting rights for racial and ethnic minorities,
including language access to voting; and continued resistance to
discriminatory English-only pressure groups. We will reverse the Bush
Administration’s assault on civil rights enforcement, and instead work to
rebuild and vigorously use machinery for civil rights enforcement; support
comparable remedies for women; aggressively prosecute hate crimes;
63 Democratic Party Platform of 1992, “A New Covenant with the American People,” Accessed
online 10 March 2006 at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/showplatforms.php?platindex=D1992
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strengthen legal services for the poor; deal with other nations in such a
way that Americans o f any origin do not become scapegoats or victims of
foreign policy disputes; provide civil rights protection for gay men and
lesbians and an end to Defense Department discrimination; respect Native
American culture and our treaty commitments; require the United States
Government to recognize its trustee obligations to the inhabitants of
Hawaii generally, and to Native Hawaiians in particular; and fully enforce
the Americans with Disability Act to enable people with disabilities to
achieve independence and function at their highest possible level.
Democrats stand behind the right of every woman to choose, consistent
with Roe v. Wade, regardless of ability to pay, and support a national law
to protect that right.
It is a fundamental constitutional liberty that individual Americans—not
government—can best take responsibility for making the most difficult and
intensely personal decisions regarding reproduction. The goal of our
nation must be to make abortion less necessary, not more difficult or more
dangerous. We pledge to support contraceptive research, family planning,
comprehensive family life education, and policies that support healthy
childbearing and enable parents to care most effectively for their children.
For Catholics, the 1992 election “reflects a marked departure from that of
previous presidential elections.”64 For the first time, Catholics did not vote more
heavily for the Democratic candidate than the Republican candidate. Indeed,
they split their votes among the top three candidates, with Independent Ross
Perot winning 23 percent of the Catholic vote. Clinton received 41 percent of the
Catholic vote while Bush attracted 36 percent of the vote.65 According to
Prendergast, Catholics in 1992 were less Republican than white evangelical
Protestants yet less Democratic than Jewish and secular voters. “They also
evidenced a stronger propensity to behave as swing voters from one election to

64 Prendergast, p. 200.
65 Kellstedt, Green, Guth, and Smidt, “Religious Voting Blocs in the 1992 Election: The Year of
the Evangelical?”, p. 317.
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another. Millions of voters including a substantial bloc of Catholics seemed to be
in search of a new political home.”66
At the heart of this growing importance of religion in electoral politics was
the rise of the Religious Right and up-tick in public debates about morality. The
year 1992 was the culmination of more than a decade of work by religious
leaders in America, leaders who had become sophisticated at mobilizing religious
voters to support their views and candidates 67 Key to the rise of the Religious
Right during this period was the 1988 failed presidential bid by Pentecostal
Republican Pat Robertson that led Robertson to join with Ralph Reed to form the
Christian Coalition out of the remnants of his political organization.68 By 1994, the
Religious Right had refined its candidate-centered politics; it was recruiting
candidates, providing them resources and mobilizing voters on their behalf.69
According to Green, the Religious Right’s activities with nomination politics and
involvement with the Republican Party afforded it an important benefit - “it
provided a forum through which to build coalitions.”70
The Christian Coalition was adept at producing compelling voter guides
that compared candidates on specific issues. In 1996, it distributed 45 million
copies of voter guides to 125,000 churches before the elections.71 Although
endorsements were rare, voters had little trouble determining the coalition’s
66 Prendergast, p. 201.
67 Green, John C., “The Christian Right and the 1994 Elections, PS: Political Science and Politics,
28:1, March 1995, p. 5.
68 Woodberry, Robert D., and Smith, Christian S., “Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative
Protestants in America,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, p. 46.
69 Green, John C., March 1995, p. 6.
70 Ibid, p. 7.
71 Kohut, Andrew, Green, John C., Keeter, Scott, and Toth, Robert C., The Diminishing Divide:
Religion’s Changing Role in American Politics, The Brookings Institution: Washington, D.C.,
2000.
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preferred candidate.72 The tactic was particularly useful for the Religious Right,
since openly identifying as a member of the Religious Right seemed popular with
only the most conservative fundamentalists. However, the messages of the
Religious Right had more support with the general public.73
Although the Christian Coalition appealed largely to evangelical
Protestants, Catholics were an important constituency for the organization and its
ability to appeal to a broad group of religious voters. Catholics were so important,
in fact, that the Christian Coalition held national workshops on how to court
Catholic voters and spotlighted Catholic speakers at its annual conferences.
National, state and local organizations put Catholics in leadership positions, and
in 1995, the coalition founded the Catholic Alliance, in the hopes of attracting
more Catholics to the organization.74 On some key issues, conservative
Catholics and the Christian Right find common ground, most notably abortion,
gay rights and restrictions on pornography; they split, however, on important
areas for Catholics, such as aid to the poor, the death penalty, support for a
social welfare system, protection of the environment and the teaching of
creationism in schools.75 And even those issues on which they found common
ground often weren’t a perfect fit for Catholics and the Christian Coalition. For
example, on the issue of homosexuality, Catholic teachings diverge from
evangelical Protestant beliefs. According to the Catholic Bishops, “a homosexual
orientation is a deep-seated dimension of the personality that is not in itself
72 Ibid.
73 Woodberry, Robert D., et. al, 1998, p. 47.
74 Bendyna, Mary E., Green, John C., Rozell, Mark J., and Wilcox, Clyde, “Uneasy Alliance:
Conservative Catholics and the Christian Right,” Sociology of Religion, 62:1, 2001, p. 52.
75 Ibid, pp. 55-59.
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sinful.”76 Homosexuals should be treated with “acceptance, love and pastoral
care,” the bishops said, reinforcing the church’s views about respecting the
dignity of every human being.77 In other words, Catholics are told to hate the sin
but love the sinner, which is quite different than the evangelical Protestant beliefs
regarding homosexuality. And while Catholics may not have been swelling the
ranks of the Christian Coalition, conservative Catholics are generally supportive
of the organization.78
As the morality debates nationwide continued, in 1994 Republicans laid
out their Contract with America79 that specified certain fiscal and legal reforms.
Although social issues were not the focus of the document, religion played a
prominent role in the justification of the initiatives. According to the contract, “It
can be the beginning of a Congress that respects the values and shares the faith
of the American family” and “Like Lincoln, our first Republican president, we
intend to act ‘with firmness in the right, as God gives us to see the right.’” During
the mid-term elections that year, Republicans gained 53 seats in the House of
Representatives and eight seats in the Senate, taking over Congress for the first
time in 40 years, an event that was coined the Republican Revolution. A majority
of Catholic voters - 52 percent - supported Republican House candidates, an
important factor considering some analysts consider the results of off-year
elections a key factor in assessing voting behavior.80 Yet while these analysts

76 Ibid, p. 53.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid, p. 57.
79 Republican Contract With America. 1994.
http://www.house.gov/house/Contract/CONTRACT.html.
80 Prendergast, p. 205.
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saw the 1994 election as evidence of a Catholic realignment with the Republican
Party, others theorized that the results were evidence of the Catholic swing vote
that could cast votes for Republicans just as easily as it could cast votes for
Democrats.81
A Majority of Catholics Support Clinton’s Re-election
Catholics watched as the Clinton administration was caught up in a web of
scandals in its first term - former Assistant Attorney General and friend Webster
Hubbell was in prison for defrauding his law practice; former Republican Solicitor
General Kenneth Starr was investigating Clinton’s history with the Whitewater
land development project; and former Arkansas state employee Paula Jones was
pursuing charges the president had sexually harassed her.82 Clinton’s
Republican challenger for the presidency in 1996, World War II veteran Bob
Dole, tried to capitalize on the Clinton scandals in his election campaign, citing
Clinton’s “character weaknesses” and the need to “restore traditional values” to
the White House.83 However, a booming economy combined with Dole’s
lackluster appeal and a growing distaste for Republican Party leadership (by
1996, outspoken House Speaker Newt Gingrich was more unpopular than any
politician since Nixon the week he left the White House84) helped propel Clinton
to the White House for a second term in 1996 with one of the lowest voter
turnouts in 75 years.

81 ibid.
Walker, Martin, “The U.S. Presidential Election, 1996,” International Affairs, 72:4, October
1996, p. 659.
83 Ibid.
84 “Man of the Year,” Time Magazine, 25 December 1995.
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Clinton won 53 percent of the Catholic vote in 1996,16 percentage points
ahead of Dole.85 “The years 1995 and 1996 saw an extraordinary political
recovery by Clinton, and an epic display of political skill during the long months of
attrition as he withstood and finally defeated the great Republican tidal wave that
had threatened to swamp his presidency.”86 With Clinton’s strong re-election, it
appeared that religious voters had lost their voice in American politics and
evangelical Christians had become passive.87 Infighting had undermined the
Christian Coalition, which dropped in one year from seventh to 35th in a fall 1999
survey of political insiders assessing political clout.88 Yet a closer look at the vote
indicates the increasing impact of the traditionalist-modernist disputes; a slim
majority of traditional Catholics supported Dole (52 percent) while a majority of
modernist Catholics backed Clinton (57 percent).89
By January 1998, however, debates about morality had taken center stage
in American politics as news of Clinton’s affair with 21-year-old White House
intern Monica Lewinsky and attempts to cover it up became public. The morality
debates continued throughout the year, culminating in impeachment proceedings
in Congress. By the November 2000 election, polls indicated that the
repercussions of Clinton’s transgressions were having an impact on voters,
particularly religious voters - while a majority of voters approved of his
performance as president, a larger majority disapproved of him as a person.90

85 Reichley, p. 316.
86 Walker, Martin, “The U.S. Presidential Election, 1996,” International Affairs, 72:4, October
1996, p. 674.
87 Reichley, p. 332.
88 Ibid.
89 Reichley, p. 316.
90 Reichley, p. 344.
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“Disapproval of Clinton as a person sprang mainly from moral disgust, not only
with his tawdry affair in the Oval Office with Monica Lewinsky and his subsequent
desperate attempts at cover-up, or his perjury, but also with the entire
atmosphere of political and ethical corruption that had settled over the White
House during Clinton’s second term. ... The main force of this disgust came from
anger over his violation of ethical standards rooted in Judeo-Christian moral
tradition.”91 According to Michael Barone in U.S. News and World Report, in the
2000 presidential election, Americans were more comfortable with religion than
they were in the Eisenhower era, “partly because the historic hatreds between
denominations have dissipated. But, partly in the wake of the Clinton scandals,
many voters express a vague desire for government policies with a moral
component.”92
Born-Again Christian President Elected
Republican George W. Bush capitalized on the religion gap in 2000 by
portraying himself as both a born-again Christian and a moderate United
Methodist.93 For born-again Christians, he was the answer to restoring family
values in the White House following the sexual scandals of the Clinton
administration; Gore was simply too closely aligned to a valueless White
House.94 Bush also was comfortable speaking about his born-again religion
during the presidential election; he even declared Jesus Christ as his favorite

91 Ibid.
92
Barone, Michael, “Religion on the Left, Religion on the Right,” U.S. News and World Report, 21
August 2000, 129:7, p. 1, C-1.
93 Guth, James L., et. al., “America Fifty/Fifty.” First Things: A Monthly Journal of Religion and
Public Life, October 2001, Issue 116, p. 22.
94 Schneider, William, "American Religion and Political Polarities,” American Sociologist, 34: 1/2,
Spring/Summer 2003, p. 83.
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philosopher,95 much to the delight of born-again Christians and traditionalists of
all faiths, including Catholics, as well as some moderate Christians. Moderates,
many middle and upper class, liked Bush’s message of entrepreneurialism when
he touted the use of faith-based programs — not government programs — to
address social needs during the presidential election.96
The 2000 election revealed “incontrovertible evidence” that Catholics were
polarized by the culture wars.97 Bush carried 53 percent of the Roman Catholic
vote, but among conservative Catholics, defeated Gore by a 3-to-1 margin.
Moderates were slightly more in favor of Bush and liberal Catholics
overwhelmingly voted for Gore. Bush’s strategy of targeting church-going
traditional Catholics - voters who profess orthodox Catholic beliefs and have
high levels of private and public religious behavior - paid off. These beliefs
include the dignity of all human beings, and the importance of community, which
translates into social teachings that emphasize protection of the poor and
marginalized; opposition to abortion, the death penalty and euthanasia; and
opposition to homosexuality.98
The abortion issue was the church’s top priority in 200099, and its effects
likely went beyond those Catholics who believed in total ban on abortion
consistent with the church’s teachings. Catholics with liberal views on most other
issues continued to vote Democratic. However, more conservative Catholics
95 Balmer, Randall, “Bush and God,” The Nation, 14 April 2003, p. 7.
96 Johnson, Jenny, “The Minister O f’Good Success’,” Christianity Today, 45:12,1 October 2001,
p. 60.
7 Guth, et. al., p. 22.
QO
Curran, Charles E., “The Pope’s Passions," Christian Century, 120:23, 15 November 2003, pp.
29-30.
99 Reichley, A. James, Faith in Politics, Brookings Institution Press: Washington, D.C., 2002, p.
321.
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could not rectify the opposite views of the Democratic Party and the church on
the abortion issue, inclining them to vote for Republicans.100 According to
scholars, “these internal divisions among Catholics are the largest ever found by
survey research, reaching all the way back to the 1930s.”101
By 2004, religion in presidential campaigns had reached a new intensity
with moral values being the most important consideration in the election.102 As a
born-again Christian, Bush was comfortable talking about his faith on a regular
basis as well as about how much he prayed. Indeed, former Secretary of State
Madeleine Albright has said that what sets Bush apart from past presidents
regarding his religion is his absolute certainty in his faith. “Most of our presidents
have invoked God in some form or another. What is different about President
Bush is that he is so certain about his religion. (He has) none of the doubts or the
issues that President Lincoln raised. Anybody who picks a fight with us is picking
a fight with God.”103 This openness and absolute faith went over well with
traditionalist voters, including Catholics. Kerry, on the other hand, seemed to be
trying to reconcile his beliefs about abortion and stem cell research with Catholic
doctrine that opposed his stands. Kerry’s Catholic faith became such an issue
that the church hierarchy spoke about it and one bishop warned him not to take
communion when visiting his archdiocese.104
When the votes were counted, the majority of Catholics again voted for

101 Guth, et. al., p. 23.
102 Denton, pp. 11-12.
103 Albright, Madeleine, comments made on “The Daily Show with Jon Stewart,” 2 May 2006.
104 Denton, p. 17.
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Bush.105 Langer and Cohen hypothesize that Bush’s gains among Catholics in
2004 were more important than his gains with evangelical Protestants; he won
white Catholics by a 13-point margin in 2004 compared to a seven-point margin
in 2000. And in 2004, Catholics represented 27 percent of the voters verses
evangelical Protestants who represented 23 percent.106 In Massachusetts, a
staunchly Democratic state and Kerry’s home state, Bush improved his support
from Catholics by 17 percentage points over 2000, the state with the largest
increase.107 The stunning result was in large part due to an impressive
Republican strategy to mobilize Catholic voters and the overwhelming support
Republicans received from former Catholic Boston Mayor Ray Flynn, the former
ambassador to the Vatican. “The Republican National Committee set up a
website (KerryWrongforCatholics.com), hired 30 full-time field coordinators, and
mobilized 55,000 volunteers to help build Catholic support for Bush. Seventy-six
million voter guides were distributed to active Catholics in 12 battleground states,
and ads ran in prime electoral targets like Ohio, Pennsylvania, and New
Hampshire.”108
Flynn’s effort was considered the lynchpin to Bush’s swell of Catholic
support. Working in concert with Archbishop Sean O’Malley, Flynn found private
funding to support a massive outreach effort to Catholics at the parish level in
Massachusetts, as well as New Hampshire and Ohio. Parishioners shared coffee
and donuts after Mass with Flynn, who explained why they should support Bush,
105 Green, Smidt, Guth and Kellstedt, p. 1
106 Langer, Gary, and Cohen, Jon, “Voters and Values in the 2004 Election,” Public Opinion
Quarterly, 69:5, Special Issue 2005, p. 753
107 O’Beirne, Kate, “Catholics For Bush,” National Review, 29 November 2004, p. 24.
108 Ibid, p. 26.
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whose positions on gay marriage and abortion were consistent with Catholic
teachings.109 After the election, Flynn told the National Review, “This was the
perfect example of how lay Catholics should respond to the challenge of
defending our values. It’s not the intention to make the Church or the Bishops
more political, but to make lay Catholics more involved.”110
By August 2005, surveys indicated Americans saw Republicans as the
protectors of religious values. Only 29 percent of those surveyed by the Pew
Research Center for the People and the Press saw the Democrats as friendly
toward religion while 55 percent viewed the Republicans as friendly toward
religion.111

109 O’Beirne, p. 26.
110 Ibid.
111 The Pew Research Center for the People and the Press, “Religion a Strength and Weakness
for Both Parties,” 30 August 2005, p. 1
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CHAPTER II

LITERATURE REVIEW

Much has been said about changes in the relationship between politics
and voting behavior for Catholics in the last 30 years. Once a staunchly loyal
Democratic voting bloc, Catholics today appear to be shifting in voting behavior.
Some say Catholics, whose immigrant ties have weakened as they have become
more affluent and educated, are becoming more conservative. Others point to a
culture war based on morality and values issues that is as appealing to traditional
Catholics as it is unappealing to liberal Catholics, but which is aligning Catholics
with those of other denominations who hold similar views. These changes in
Catholic voting behavior have lead scholars to deem Catholics as the new swing
voters - a denomination that, as a whole, is without a political homeland.
Scholars generally have relied on two primary models for assessing
changes in the relationship between religion and voting behavior: the
ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis. The ethnoreligious model looks
at shifts in voting behavior based on traditional denominational-political
alignments. Developed in the late 20th century, the culture wars thesis assesses
the relationship by evaluating religious commitment. In this section, I will discuss
these models, and assess their strengths and weaknesses relative to Catholic
voting behavior.
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The Ethnoreligious Model

For centuries, American voting has been shaped by ethnoreligious
loyalties. These loyalties tie religious denominations to specific class, ethnic,
cultural and community identities that are critical in determining partisan ties for
its members.112 Developed by historians and used by political scientists, the
ethnoreligious model relies primarily on religious belonging - the effects of
religious tradition and not the effects of religious beliefs or behaviors - to
“produce distinctive group identification and distinctive cultural and political
values.” 113 What matters in the ethnoreligious model are the differences
between, not within, religious traditions.114
Kellstedt and Green acknowledge that other factors, such as religious
commitment (which is the cornerstone of the culture wars thesis) and the social
environment of the voter, influence voting behavior and may provide insight in
assessing religion and voting behavior. However, they maintain that the core
influencer on voting behavior is denominational choice - other factors simply
enhance it.115 “Denominational preference matters in politics because
denominations are important: they are central to religious life, objects of deeply
held commitments, and together with their component institutions, the most
common form of voluntary association in the United States Denominations are
characterized by all of the processes that create and maintain group
112 Guth.et. al., p. 19.
113 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 64.
114 Ibid.
115 Kellstedt, Lyman A., and Green, John C., “Knowing God’s Many People: Denominational
Preference and Political Behavior,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, pp.
54-55, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt, M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
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identification, and the core of such identification is attachment to broader culture
traditions.”116
In the United States scholars generally recognize six major
denominational families: white mainline Protestants, white evangelical
Protestants, black Protestants, Roman Catholics, Jews, and
nonreligious/secular117. A denominational affiliation is so significant important that
“more than four-fifths of American adults routinely express a denominational
preference of one kind or another - more, in fact, than identity with a political
party.”118 The ethnoreligious-political alignments have historically been quite
stable: Mainline Protestants voted for the Whig and then Republican candidates,
and evangelical Protestants, Catholics, secularists, Jews and black Protestants
supported Democratic candidates.119
The traditional ethnoreligious loyalties of Catholics have been aligned
solidly with Democratic candidates since the mid-1800s when the pro
temperance Whig Party, and then the Republican Party, had a collation with the
major Protestant churches.120 “The Democrats aggressively courted the new
immigrants and made a generous immigration policy a cornerstone of their party
platforms.”121 Considered a decisive factor in presidential elections, the “Catholic
Vote” was so important to politicians that Democrats often attributed their wins to
Catholics. Indeed, New Hampshire’s only native son to hold the presidency,

116 Ibid, p. 65.
117 Ibid, p. 54.
118 Ibid.
119 Ibid, p. 56.
120 Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin, E., “It’s the Culture
Stupid! 1992 and Our Political Future,” First Things, 42, April 1994, p. 29.
121 Kapp, p. 18
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Democratic President Franklin Pierce, won the election because of the “foreign
vote and the Catholic influence” in 1852.122 The anti-Catholic, anti-immigrant
rhetoric of the Republican Party at the time helped unite groups of ethnically
diverse populations of new Americans: poor and uneducated Irish, Germans,
Italians, Poles, and other ethnic groups from eastern and southern Europe. “No
other religious group in the United States holds within its ranks so varied a
mixture of ethnic strains as the Catholic Church.”123
By the turn of the century, the population of Catholics had increased 85
percent from 9 to 16 million from 1890 to 1910. In comparison, the population of
the United States increased 50 percent.124 The first wave of immigrants from the
1840s and 1850s were having children and grandchildren who were being
educated in the rapidly growing network of parochial schools, further unifying
Catholics as a community.125 Catholic involvement in national politics escalated
as the country moved into the 1920s, and for many Catholics, the bitter 1928
presidential election in which anti-Catholic venom by Republicans and their
supporters reached new heights would have a lasting effect benefiting
Democratic candidates. New Catholic voters turned out in overwhelming
numbers in support of Catholic Democrat and anti-Prohibition candidate Al Smith,
and their newfound heavy involvement in national politics that year would have a
lasting effect in following years: Franklin D. Roosevelt would be elected to the

Prendergast, p. 85.
123 Prendergast, p. 5.
124 Prendergast, p. 71.
125 Ibid, p. 72.
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first of four terms in 1932 with unwavering Catholic support.126 “The most
significant result of the 1928 election...was not the Republican gains in the
South, which proved to be ephemeral, but the mobilization of Catholic voters in
northern cities, which would help produce a new Democratic majority in the
1930s.”127
The election of Roosevelt brought the New Deal years, for the first time,
Catholics found themselves in powerful positions at the national level. Twentyfive percent of federal judge positions were filled by Catholics during the
Roosevelt years, compared to just 4 percent in the previous three Republican
administrations.128 Roosevelt courted clergy at the highest levels of the Catholic
Church, so much so that many of the ideas of the New Deal seemed to come
straight from the social and economic teachings of the church. “A document
issued in 1919 entitled the ‘Bishops’ Program for Social Reconstruction’
foreshadowed certain elements of the program of the Roosevelt administration,
including legislation establishing a minimum wage, insurance protected the aged
and the unemployed, and recognition of labor’s right to organize.”129
The 1950s saw the return of Republicans in the White House. Although
the overwhelming majority of Catholics still identified as Democrats in the 1950s,
the Korean War, communist fears and corruption in the previous Democratic
administration began to erode the strong ethnoreligious ties of the Catholics to

Ibid, p. 111.
127 Reichley, pp. 210-211.
128 Prendergast, p. 113.
129 Ibid.
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the Democratic Party.130 The anti-Communist stance of Republican Dwight D.
Eisenhower had particular resonance with Catholics. Efforts by eastern European
countries to suppress the Catholic Church did not set well with immigrants who
shared ethnic ties with their oppressed brethren. In addition, for decades the
Pope and church hierarchy had regularly warned about the threat of
Communism.131
However, any erosion of the ethnoreligous ties to the Democrats was
turned on its face in 1960 with the election of the first Catholic president, John F.
Kennedy. Like Democrat Al Smith of 1928, Kennedy was faced with the same
questions about dual allegiances - allegiance to the pope and Catholic Church,
or allegiance to the American democracy. However unlike Smith, Kennedy was
able to effectively answer “the Catholic question.” To those trying to make hay
out of his loyalties, his famous response made before the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association was this: “I am not the Catholic candidate for president. I
am the Democratic Party's candidate for president, who happens also to be a
Catholic. I do not speak for my church on public matters, and the church does not
speak for me."132 Still, religion was the strongest single factor in the election,
with 78 percent of Catholics voting for Kennedy, compared to 38 percent of
Protestants.133

130 Ibid, p. 123.
131 Ibid, p. 125.
132 "On Church and State: Remarks of John F. Kennedy Addressed to the Greater Houston
Ministerial Association," 363-76, in The Kennedy Reader, ed. Jay David, The Bobbs-Merrill
Company, Inc., Indianapolis, Indiana, 1967, p. 366.
133 Prendergast, p. 143.
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It appeared in 1960 that JFK had halted the erosion of the CatholicDemocratic Party alliance. However, Vietnam and cultural issues about abortion,
women’s rights and civil rights soon would surface in the 1960s and 1970s,
redefining how Americans thought about religion. New organizations such as the
conservative Moral Majority would surface to exploit these cultural rifts, and by
1980, it would become apparent that many Catholics were finding their traditional
ties to Democratic candidates had become increasingly uncomfortable. Born out
of this late 20,h century cultural upheaval would be a new way of looking at the
relationship between politics and voting behavior - the culture wars thesis. Also
called the secularization of America, the culture wars thesis holds that those who
are more religious tend to vote for more conservative candidates (Republicans)
and those who are less religious tend to support candidates with more liberal
views (Democrats). I will discuss the culture wars thesis in more depth in the next
section.
However, before I conclude the discussion of the ethnoreligious model, it’s
important to note that for Catholics, ethnoreligious factors are strongly tied to
economic and job-related issues common in class politics: minimum wage, health
care, unionization. The ethnoreligious model holds that any political realignments
of the major denominational families reflect demographic, political and religious
change - that religious traditions are not static. Not only do old traditions vary
and evolve, but new ones are born.134According to Layman, the ethnoreligious
model works well explaining the historical and political differences between these

134 Kellstedt and Green, p. 56.
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traditions, and even works well with explaining more recent trends in voting
behavior among members of denominational families.135
However, some scholars hypothesize that the recent denominational shifts
in voting behavior are due less to denominational realignments than to religiosity
(also called saliency) - the importance of religion to someone or the strength of
their religious commitment.136 And according to Layman, these shifts based on
religiosity - not religious traditions - have led some scholars to consider the
ethnoreligious model outdated.137
A critical look at the ethnoreligious model reveals that it may have become
a less effective assessment of the relationship between religion and voting
behavior for Catholics. It focuses only on denominational shifts, not inter
denominational shifts, which are becoming increasingly relevant to understanding
politics in the context of religion. For example, scholars point out that Catholics
have increasing shifted from voting Democrat to Republican, but by looking at
Catholics as a whole using the ethnoreligious model, shifts in voting behavior
among Catholics with differing levels of religious orthodoxy are not evident.
Woodbury and Smith note that most surveys used the limited and broad
categories to assess denominational affiliation: Protestant, Roman Catholic,
Jewish, or other. Even surveys that provide for a more detailed affiliation
description, such as breaking Protestant down by Lutheran, Baptist,

135 Layman, Geoffrey C., The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party
Politics, ed. Robert Y. Shapiro, Columbia University Press: New York, 2001, p. 65
136 Guth, James L., and Green, John, C., “Salience: The Core Concept?,” in Rediscovering the
Religious Factor in American Politics, pp. 157-158, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt,
M.E Sharpe: New York, 1993.
137 Layman, 2001, p. 66.
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Presbyterian, are problematic because they do not address distinctions of the
conservative, centrist and modern elements of these religious denominations.
“When respondents say they are ‘Lutheran’ or “Presbyterian,’ researchers need
to ask, ‘Which kind?”’ 138An increasing body of scholarly research indicates that
inter-denominational shifts based on religious orthodoxy are creating new
alignments of voters.
In addition, the ethnoreligious model may not effectively reflect changes in
the class and communal bonds that have occurred in the last 20 to 30 years.
Communities of largely poor, uneducated immigrants and ethnic groups, such as
Catholics, have been disappearing as newcomers of different backgrounds move
to these areas. Today’s more mobile society has resulted in a decrease in
communal involvement, as evidenced by declines in church attendance and
community organization memberships. Churches once were the center of a
community binding like-minded people together.
According to scholars, since the 1960s, the nation has been losing “social
capital - the everyday social and organizational connections that nurture citizens’
values, define their interests, and connect them to public affairs.” 139 According to
Putnam, weekly church attendance has dropped from 48 percent in the 1950s to
41 percent in the 1970s, with it stagnating or dropping even further after the
1970s.140 Union membership has been in steep decline for four decades, and
involvement in Parent Teacher Associations has plummeted from 12 million in
138 Woodberry, Robert D., and Smith, Christian S., “Fundamentalism Et Al: Conservative
Protestants in America,” Annual Review of Sociology, 24, 1998, p. 34.
139 Guth, et. al., October 2001, p. 20.
140 Putnam, Robert, “Bowling Alone: America’s Declining Social Capital,” Journal of Democracy,
6:1, January 1995, p. 69.
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1964 to 7 million in the mid-1990s.141 Dramatic declines also have been seen in
membership with civic organizations such as the Boy Scouts (down 26 percent
since 1970), and the League of Women Voters (down 42 percent since 1969).142
Fraternal organizations also have not been immune to the declines in
membership. “Membership is down significantly in such groups as the Lions (off
12 percent since 1983), the Elks (off 18 percent since 1979), the Shriners (off 27
percent since 1979), the Jaycees (off 44 percent since 1979), and the Masons
(down 39 percent since 1959). In sum, after expanding steadily throughout most
of this century, many major civic organizations have experienced a sudden,
substantial, and nearly simultaneous decline in membership over the last decade
or two.”143
Furthermore, some scholars have noted that in the last few decades, the
United States has seen a decline in the strength of class as an influencer of
voting.144 This decline in class voting may be due to the growing influence of
cultural issues on voting behavior.
Using denominational affiliation as a predictor of voting behavior was
logical when Americans were more communal and denominations were more
clearly defined by social stratification. However, as more people have become
detached from communities and as issues of class have eased, the use of
denomination affiliation - upon which the ethnoreligious model relies - as a
predictor of voting behavior appears to have weakened. The strength of the
141 Putnam, p. 69.
142 Ibid.
143 Ibid.
144 Weakliem, David L., “Race versus Class? Racial Composition and Class Voting, 1936-1992,”
Social Forces, 75:3, March 1997, p. 939.
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ethnoreligious model lies in its long-term stability reinforced by community and
cultural bonds. However, the mobility of Americans today coupled with their
diminished ties to their communities and traditional culture, as well as their
growing affluence and educational levels, may be weakening the impact of the
ethnoreligious model as a predictor of voting behavior. Americans have adapted
their relationship between religion and politics to a more mobile system, one that
relies little on where they live and where they came from.
The Culture Wars Thesis
Beginning in the 1990s, scholars note the emergence of a new
relationship between religion and voting behavior based on levels of religious
orthodoxy within denominations. Known as the culture war thesis, this new
realignment differs from the ethnoreligious model because it is based on the idea
that there is a growing divide between people who are more religious and people
who are less religious, regardless of denomination. Fueling the divide between
traditionalists (people with more orthodox beliefs who are highly engaged in
religious worship) and those with more centrist and modern religious views are
cultural and social issues. According to Layman, “cultural issues such as abortion
and homosexual rights are central to the culture war thesis.”145 Instead of voting
based on religious belonging and religious tradition, voters were aligning
according to their level of religiosity, most often measured by how often they
attend church.
According to Bolce and De Maio, 1992 was a “critical demarcation point”
for the relationship between religion and voting behavior because concerns about
145 Layman, 2001, p. 68.
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cultural and social issues aligned previously antagonistic denominational factions
into this new framework, which included an acceptance of Christian
fundamentalism.146 Voters who were more religious - regardless of denomination
or denominational family - now found themselves with more in common than with
believers within their denomination who were more centrist and modernist. By
2004, traditionalists and centrists had switched from Democrat to Republican,
and modernists had reversed course, voting Democrat in 2004 after voting
Republican in 2000.147
In the culture wars thesis, traditionalists tend to vote Republican.148
“Traditionalists of all sorts tend to regard religion as more central to their lives
than other groups, and perhaps not surprisingly, they report greater relevance to
their political thinking.”149 Moderate believers, characterized by heterodox beliefs
and lower religious engagement, are more likely to vote Democrat, regardless of
denomination. Centrists are neither traditionalists nor modernists, and practice a
mix of orthodox and heterodox beliefs with moderate levels of religious
engagement. “Most centrists were willing to adapt their traditions in a changing
world.”150
Layman’s research about presidential vote and partisan identification from
1980 to 1994 indicates that even in 1980 there was evidence of a growing

146 Bolce, Louis, and De Maio, Gerald, “Religious Outlook, Culture War Politics, and Antipathy
Toward Christian Fundamentalists,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 63,1999, p. 52.
147 Green, John, C., et. al., “The American Religious Landscape and the 2004 Presidential Vote:
Increased Polarization,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 3 February 2005, p. 14.
148 Green, John C., “The American Religious Landscape and Political Attitudes: A Baseline for
2004,” The Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, based on the Fourth National Survey of
Religion and Politics, Bliss Institute, University of Akron, March-May 2004, p. 16
149 Ibid.
150 Ibid, p. 4.
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relationship between religious orthodoxy and voting behavior.151 He concludes
that the growing effect of religious orthodoxy on voting behavior was the “most
noticeable change in the impact of religion on American political behavior” over
the period. Supporting Layman’s theory, Kellstedt and his colleagues determined
that religious orthodoxy was the second strongest predictor of votes for Bush in
1 9 9 2

152

However, they remark that 1992 could easily have been considered the

Year of the Evangelical or the Year of the Secular since “the new role of
evangelicals and seculars as the cultural cores of the Republican and
Democratic parties, respectively, puts them in key positions to shape the
ideological contours of those parties.”153 And as evangelicals and seculars had
moved squarely to their corners of the ring, Catholics had moved into the center
as swing voters.154 By 1994, the differences in voting behavior based on religious
Orthodoxy rivaled past ethnoreligious differences between Jews, Catholics, and
mainline Protestants.155
As America moved through the mid-1990s, Layman and Carmines note
that not only was religious traditionalism becoming more relevant in society, it
was playing “a larger role in shaping the cultural conflict in the nation’s

131 Layman, 1997, p. 298.
152 Layman, Geoffrey C., and Carmines, Edward G., “Cultural Conflict in American Politics:
Religious Traditionalism, Postmaterialism, and U.S. Political Behavior,” The Journal of Politics,
59:3, August 1997, p. 767.
153 Kellstedt, Lyman A., Green, John C., Guth, James L., and Smidt, Corwin E., “Religious Voting
Blocs in the 1992 Election: the year of the Evangelical?”, Sociology of Religion, 55:3, 1994, p.
3 23

154 Ibid, p. 324.
155 Layman, Geoffrey C., “Religion and Political Behavior in the United States: The Impact of
Beliefs, Affiliations, and Commitment From 1980 to 1994,” Public Opinion Quarterly, 61, 1997, p.
306.
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politics.”156 By 2000, the culture war thesis seemed even more relevant as the
morality issues from the Clinton Administration and culture clashes cast shadows
over the election. “The outcome revealed the consolidation of a new religious
order in American politics, an altered relationship between faith and public
affairs.”157
One of the most recent public examples of the culture wars thesis
occurred in the summer of 2004, when the nation was transfixed by the climax of
the year-long battle in Massachusetts to become the first state in the nation to
legalize same-sex marriage. Combined with similar efforts in San Francisco and
New York, the gay rights and same-sex marriage debate was one of the most
prominent cultural discussions in the period before the November 2004
presidential election. That election year, 11 states considered ballot initiatives
regarding a ban on same-sex marriage and in every state, the ban prevailed,
sometimes with large majorities of voter support.158 “Oregon represented gayrights groups’ best hope for victory, but an amendment banning same-sex
marriage prevailed there with 57 percent of the votes, leaving some activists in
tears. Similar bans won by larger margins in Arkansas, Georgia, Kentucky,
Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Ohio and Utah. More
than 20 million Americans voted on the measures, which triumphed overall by a
2-to-1 ratio. In the four Southern states, the amendments received at least three-

156 Layman and Carmines, p. 767.
157 Guth, et, al., October 2001, p. 19.
158 2004 Election Results, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTIQN/2004/Daqes/results/ballot.measures/.
accessed 12 January 2006.
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quarters of the votes, including 86 percent in Mississippi; the closest outcome
besides Oregon was in Michigan, where the ban got 59 percent.”159
Some analysts said prior to the election that support for gay marriage or
civil unions could be a “wedge” issue that separates moderate voters, including
moderate Catholics, from Democratic candidates the way school busing and
welfare reform once did.160 In fact, in November 2003 Pew found that not only
were the number of Americans who oppose gay marriage on the rise, a majority
of Americans opposed civil unions and similar legal agreements.161 “Moreover,
despite the overall rise in tolerance toward gays since the 1980s, many
Americans remain highly critical of homosexuals and religious belief is a major
factor in these attitudes. Religiosity is clearly a factor in the recent rise in
opposition to gay marriage162. Overall, nearly six-in-ten Americans (59 percent)
oppose gay marriage, up from 53 percent in July. But those with a high level of
religious commitment now oppose gay marriage by more than six-to-one (80
percent-12 percent), a significant shift since July (71 percent-21 percent). The
public is somewhat more supportive of legal agreements for gays that provide
many of the same benefits of marriage; still, a 51 percent majority also opposes
this step.”163
In addition, according to Guth and his colleagues, those actively and
aggressively involved in the culture wars have taken advantage of the decline in

159 “Voters pass all 11 bans on gay marriage,” The Associated Press, 3 November 2004.
Accessed online at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/6383353/.
160 Stone, Andrea, “Gay marriage looms large for ’04,” USA Today, 19 November 2003.
161 “Religious Beliefs Underpin Opposition To Homosexuality,” the Pew Research Center for the
People and the Press, and the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 18 November 2003, p. 1.
162 Ibid.
163 Ibid.
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memberships in social organizations previously discussed. “On one side,
traditionalists lamented the erosion of family life, religious institutions, and
traditional values caused not only by impersonal social developments but also by
the conscious assaults of modernists. For their part, modernists attacked
traditional institutions in the hope of building broader and more inclusive
communities. Indeed, modernists - and their secular allies - were often as
disturbed by decaying civic life as the traditionalists, but preferred to envision
new institutions, not resuscitate old ones.”164
The new realignment according to religious orthodoxy has been so
significant that, as previously discussed, groups of conservative Christians such
as the Christians Coalition have tried to capitalize on it regarding conservative
Catholics. Seculars, too, have tried to capitalize on the new alignment with efforts
to “reform” religious traditions to make them more relevant to a secular society.
“The flags of denominational or religious affiliation, it would appear, are
increasingly less distracting in American national politics. In the absence of this
distraction, candidates, voters and elected officials alike are in a better position to
focus on more fundamental, underlying issues.”165
While there is strong evidence to support the culture wars thesis as the new
realignment in how Americans tie religion to politics, I believe its fundamental
weakness may lie in the reliance on fluid cultural issues. In years that morality
issues are at the forefront, it may be a strong predictor of voting behavior based
on religiosity. But in years when fiscal, security and other nonmorality issues that

164 Guth, James L., et. a!., October 2001, p. 20.
165 Breyfogle, pp. 546-547.
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are on the minds of Americans, it may weaken as a predictor of voting behavior.
In addition, cultural issues are not static. The concerns of Americans in the 1950s
are different than the concerns of Americans in 2006. As Americans modify their
views on cultural matters, old alignments that clearly pit traditionalists vs.
modernists may shift, and the culture wars thesis may become less useful as a
predictor of voting behavior.
For analyzing Catholic voting behavior, the culture wars thesis may be a
weak indicator of the nonmorality issues that are so critical to the faith,
particularly those about social and economic justice. Aid to the poor is a long
standing aspect of Catholic social teachings, and concern for the environment is
increasingly becoming a central part of it. By looking at just morality issues, the
culture wars thesis misses highly significant aspects of what it means to be
Catholic and why Catholics may support certain candidates.
Questioning the Ethnoreligious Model
While denominational affiliations historically have been shown to be strong
predictors of voting behavior, scholars note other factors that must be taken into
consideration in order for the model to be reliable. Specifically, changes in voter
turnout must be accounted for when measuring the impact of the ethnoreligious
model on voting behavior. In addition, while voters may experience shifts in
attitudes about specific issues, the denominations to which they subscribe have
remained relatively stable from an ideological standpoint for decades.
The ethnoreligious model can be problematic from a measurement
standpoint, particularly when research lacks an assessment of the impact of
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changes in the level of voter turnout.166 Pollster Andrew Kohut believes the role
of religion regarding voting behavior in the 2004 election was overstated. Overall,
voter participation increased, and the participation rate among evangelical
Protestants was on par with those of other denominations. It was turnout and a
“leadership gap,” not religion, which was the deciding factor for Bush.167
According to Kohut, voters became increasingly less comfortable with Kerry’s
leadership abilities as election day neared. After the Bush campaign saw that
moderate and liberal Republicans were less comfortable with their choices for
president in 2004 than in 2000, the Republicans “turned the election into a
referendum — from a referendum on Bush to a referendum on Kerry, starting
with the Swift Boat controversy and culminating in the convention, and it
remained that throughout the election. The debates almost turned it around for
Kerry but in the end, people could not get comfortable with him on the leadership
dimension.”168
In their study spanning three decades, Brooks and Manza noted that from
1972 to 2000, Catholics experienced little change, representing about 26 percent
of voters.169 When considering changes in the size of religious groups, partisan
identification and voting behavior, Brooks and Manza conclude that Catholics
have not experienced a conservative group-specific shift in voting behavior, but

166 Brooks and Manza, p. 427.
167 Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, “How the Faithful Voted: Political Alignments & the
Religious Divide in Election 2004,” 17 November 2004. Accessed 28 January 2006,
http://pewforum.org/events/index.php?EventlD=64.
168 Ibid.
169 Brooks and Manza, p. 440.
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have shifted in partisan identification from a liberal, strong identification with the
Democratic Party to an independent orientation.170
Bolzendahl and Brooks assessed denominational shifts by looking at
attitudes about gender, abortion and sexuality since the 1970s. They found that
denominational groups have experienced shifts related to their attitudes about
these subjects, but that the ideological position of these religious denominations
in relation to each other on these issues has been stable since the 1970s.171 In
fact, instead of finding that religious groups are becoming more polarized on
issues, which supports the theory of a growing religion gap, Bolzendahl and
Brooks find that instances of a perceived religion gap on specific issues occur
during a period of relative stability of denominational shifts.172 “While there is little
reason to believe religious group memberships are tied to a decline or sweeping
polarization in attitudes, our results do attest to the historical persistence of
denominational influence and the strength of that influence. An examination of
group-based differences suggests the nontrivial (and in some cases quite large)
magnitude of religious group differences in attitudes toward gender, abortion and
sexuality.”173
Questioning the Culture Wars Thesis
Scholars also have questioned the validity of research that pits
traditionalists of all faiths in opposition with centrists and modernists. “There are

1'u Ibid, p. 442.
171
Bolzendahl, Catherine, and Brooks, Clem, “Polarization, Secularization or Differences as
Usual? The Denominational Cleavages in U.S. Social Attitudes since the 1970s,” The
Sociological Quarterly, 46, 2005, p. 72.
172 Ibid, p. 68.
173 Ibid, p. 72.
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conflicts between the more and less religious members of religious traditions on
contentious issues such as abortion. But...religious groups do not line up
predictably across each and every political issue.”174 Brooks and Manza
conclude that evidence of a religion gap or culture war in American politics tied to
religion is weak. “Our estimates of the overall religious cleavage in vote choice
show no increase (and a modest decrease) over time. To date...the ideas of a
‘culture war’ (or more simply, growing religious-based electoral differences) offers
limited analytical leverage to understand the political effects of religious group
memberships.”175
Other scholars say that the most common measurement tool used to
evaluate levels of religiosity in the culture war thesis - church attendance - is
insufficient. Many researchers use only one measure of religiosity - church
attendance. However, Woodberry and Smith conclude that looking at church
attendance alone does not reflect the multiple dimensions of religious orthodoxy.
“This assumes that religiosity is generic, that it does not matter what people
believe or what the social context of their worship is. However, sometimes
denomination strongly influences the impact of church attendance. Why people
attend is also important.”176 According to Gorsuch, people attend church for a
number of reasons, including personal, religious and social reasons, and their
values and societal beliefs differ depending on why they attend church.177

1,4 Wald, p. 174.
175 Brooks and Manza, p. 442
176 Woodberry and Smith, p. 38.
177 Gorsuch, Richard L., “Psychology of Religion,” Annual Review of Psychology, 38, 1988, p.
212 .
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CHAPTER III

OPERATIONALIZATION, MEASUREMENT AND HYPOTHESES

Before I discuss whether Catholics are the new swing voter and what
factors are influencing them, the first question that must be answer is, who are
swing voters? Despite claims by pollsters and reporters about who is a swing
voter, they rarely explain who these voters are and scholars largely have ignored
the concept of defining and measuring swing voters. However, Mayer attempts to
not only define who a swing voter is - someone who is not committed either way
and who holds no allegiances to any candidate - but also provide a method to
measure swing voter behavior.178
I will employ the method developed by Mayer that uses survey responses
to NES pre-election survey feeling thermometers to devise a swing voter scale.
Respondents are asked to indicate how favorably or unfavorably they view each
presidential candidates by rating them on a feeling thermometer that runs from 0
to 100 degrees. The scale used is constructed by subtracting the rating for the
Democratic presidential candidate from the Republican candidate; higher scale
scores indicate greater Republicanism. According to Mayer, “one advantage of
using a scale of this sort is that it provides a nuanced, graduated measure of a

178 Mayer, p. 3.
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voter's convertability or ‘swingness.’”179 Voters with a score between -15 and
+15 are considered swing voters, and everyone else is considered a non-swing
voter (either a core Democrat with a score between -100 and -16, or a core
Republican with a score between 16 and 100). After defining swing voters, I will
look at whether Catholics are more likely to be classified as swing voters than
non-Catholics. Following this analysis, I will evaluate Catholics using the two
models previously discussed: ethnoreligious model and the culture wars thesis.
For the ethnoreligious model, I will look at the similarities and differences
between Catholic and non-Catholic voting trends. If Catholic voting behavior is
trending similar to non-Catholic voting behavior, one could argue that the
ethnoreligious model is a weak predictor of denominational voting behavior. In
addition, as previously noted, some scholars say that as Catholics have become
more educated and affluent, which are both indicators of class, their voting
behavior has shifted toward the Republican Party. One could argue that changes
in the educational levels and economic status of Catholics are a refinement of the
ethnoreligious model, which has a strong economic component. To account for
these two possible influences of voting behavior, I will also include independent
variables that measure education level and income level, and evaluate whether
Catholics are trending in similar ways to non-Catholics regarding voting behavior,
and changes in education and income. Also, much has been said about the blue
state-red state divide in America, with Northeastern and Western states voting for

179 Ibid, p. 7.
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Democratic candidates (blue) and Southern and North Central states backing
Republican candidates (red). My analysis will include an assessment of Catholic
voting behavior by region to see if these regional characteristics are impacting
Catholic voting behavior. Finally, Hispanics are the fastest growing minority in the
United States, and the vast majority are Catholics. My analysis of the
ethnoreligious model will include an assessment of Hispanic Catholics and
whether their voting behavior differs from that of white Catholics.
For the culture wars thesis, I will measure whether there is a strong
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior. I will also compare
Catholic and non-Catholic voting behavior by looking at church attendance.
Denton’s research shows that church attendance - the most common measure
of religiosity - and not religious affiliation, was a more accurate predictor of
voting tendencies in 2004. He cites National Exit Poll results showing that those
who attend religious services from few times a month to more than once a week
tended to vote for Bush. Kerry tended to garner votes from those who attend
services a few times a year or not at all.180 Like Green, Denton targets
traditionalists as those voting Republican, and modernists - in particular,
secularists - voting Democrat.181 Djupe also emphasizes the importance of
church attendance, arguing that religious orthodoxy as measured by church

180 Denton, p. 24.
181 Ibid, p. 27.
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attendance generates religious brand loyalty, which is a significant predictor of
voting behavior.182
Finally, I will look at two issues that have played important roles in recent
elections: abortion and gay rights. As has been discussed, scholars have noted
the tendency of the hot-button abortion debate to create single-issue voters.
Likewise, scholars noted the gay rights issue as a possible wedge issue in the
2004 election. I will look at whether either of these issues has had a significant
impact on Catholic voting behavior from 1992 to 2004, and whether Catholics
appear to be single-issue voters.
To measure the impact of the abortion issue, I will use the following
question:
By Law, When Should Abortion Be Allowed?
There has been some discussion about abortion during recent years. Which
one of the opinions on this page best agrees with your view?
1. By law, abortion should never be permitted.
2. The law should permit abortion only in case of rape, incest, or when the
woman's life is in danger.
3. The law should permit abortion for reasons other than rape, incest, or
danger to the woman's life, but only after the need for the abortion has been
clearly established.
4. By law, a woman should always be able to obtain an abortion as a matter
of personal choice.
To measure the impact of the gay rights issue, I will use the following
questions:

182

Djupe, Paul A., “Religious Brand Loyalty and Political Loyalties,” Journal for the Scientific
Study of Religion, 2000, p. 86.
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Do you think homosexuals should be allowed to serve in the United States
Armed Forces or don't you think so?
1. Yes, think so
2. Don't think so
Do you favor or oppose laws to protect homosexuals against job
discrimination?
1. Favor
2. Oppose

Hypotheses
This report contains several hypotheses:
• Catholics are more likely to be swing voters in America than nonCatholics (H i). The null hypothesis (Ho) states that Catholics are not
more likely to be swing voters than non-Catholics.
•

Catholics have experienced a decline in the influence of ethnoreligious
factors regarding voting behavior (H2). The null hypothesis (H 0) states
that Catholics have not experience a decline in the influence of
ethnoreligious factors regarding voting behavior.

•

Cultural issues are influencing Catholic voters (H3). The null hypothesis
(Ho) states that cultural issues are not influencing Catholic voters.

• Single issues, such as abortion and gay rights, are significantly
influencing Catholic voters (H4). The null hypothesis (Ho) states that
single issues, such as abortion and gay rights, are not influencing
Catholic voters.
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CHAPTER IV

ANALYSIS

Swing Voters
From 1992 to 2004, Catholics overall were slightly more likely to be swing
voters than non-Catholics, particularly in 2000, which was the only year the
results were significant.
Table 1
Catholic and Non-Catholic Swing Voters From 1992 To 2004
Swing Voter

Not Swing Voter

(N=)

Catholic
Non-Catholic

32%
30%

68%
70%

(582)
(1903)

Catholic
Non-Catholic

23%
25%

77%
75%

(425)
(1289)

Catholic
Non-Catholic

34%
30%

66%
70%

(460)
(1347)

Catholic
Non-Catholic

21%
20%

79%
80%

(292)
(920)

1992

1996

2000

2004

1992: =1.161, df=1, not significant
1996: xz=.452, df=1, not significant
2000: x2=3.035, df=1, p<.05
2004: x2=. 173, df=1t not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Evaluating the Ethnoreligious Model

Educational Levels
Catholic voters have been obtaining higher levels of education than voters
of other denominations throughout the study period.
Table 2
Catholic and Non-Catholic Education Levels: 1992-2004
1992

1996

2000

2004

7%
42%
26%
25%
100%
(568)

4%
37%
27%
32%
100%
(423)

2%
34%
31%
33%
100%
(459)

3%
37%
26%
34%
100%
(292)

8%
46%
23%
23%
100%
(1852)

5%
43%
27%
26%
100%
(1288)

4%
36%
30%
30%
100%
(1341)

3%
35%
33%
29%
100%
(920)

Catholic
Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree
(N=)
Non-Catholic
Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree
(N=)
1992: x2-4.444, df=3, not significant
1996: X2=7.033, df=3, p<.05
2000: x2=4.566, df=3, not significant
2004: ^=5.461, df=3, p<.05
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

The majority of the most educated Catholics - those with a college degree
- are the fastest growing group of Catholics, and in 2004, the majority of voters in
this group voted for the Republican presidential candidate. In addition, the
majority of the least educated Catholics - those with a high school diploma or
less - still fall in line with traditional ethnoreligious trends of voting for Democratic
presidential candidates. However, these numbers have been declining since the
percentage of Catholics with lower levels of education has been decreasing. The
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relationship between vote choice and education for Catholics was significant only
in 1992 and 1996.
Table 3
Catholic Voting Behavior and Education Levels 1992-2004
Democrat

Republican

(N=)

Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree

72%
69%
64%
49%

28%
31%
36%
51%

(18)
(123)
(77)
(101)

Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree

70%
76%
57%
47%

30%
24%
43%
53%

(10)
(86)
(72)
(106)

Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree

75%
57%
49%
45%

25%
43%
51%
55%

(4)
(97)
(95)
(123)

Grade School
High School
Some College (No Degree)
College Degree

100%
51%
56%
46%

0
49%
44%
54%

(2)
(63)
(50)
(82)

1992

1996

2000

2004

Note: The results for those with a grade school education are misleading because of the low
number of respondents in the category. The results for 2000 reflect 4 respondents and the results
for 2004 reflect just 2 respondents, both of whom voted for the Democratic candidate.
1992: ^=10.182, df=3, p<01
1996: / = 1 6.568, df=3, p<.001
2000: x2=3.709, df=3, not significant
2004: X*=3.130, df=3, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

Changes in Income Levels
Catholics and non-Catholics are exhibiting similar trends regarding income
levels as they do regarding educational levels. While the percentages differ
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slightly, Catholics and non-Catholics moved in concert regarding income levels
over the four election cycles, with both groups seeing corresponding increases
and decreases.
Table 4
Catholic and Non-Catholic Income Levels: 1992-2004
1992
1996
2000
Income Level
Catholic
1-16 percentile
17%
20%
16%
17-33 percentile
17%
18%
21%
34-67 percentile
28%
23%
32%
68-95 percentile
37%
28%
24%
7%
7%
96-100 percentile
7%
100%
100%
100%
(387)
(534)
(378)
(N=)
Non-Catholic
1-16 percentile
17%
20%
16%
17-33 percentile
16%
22%
16%
34-67 percentile
25%
32%
30%
68-95 percentile
26%
35%
25%
96-100 percentile
6%
6%
7%
100%
100%
100%
(1747) (1177) (1137)
(N=)

2004

11%
23%
32%
31%
4%
100%
(262)
18%
20%
25%
33%
3%
100%
(808)

‘ Percentile correspond to the following annual incomes:
1992: 1-16: none-$9,999; 17-33: $10,000-$19,999; 34-67: $20,000-$39,999; 68-95: $40,000$89,999; 96-100: $90,000+
1996: 1-16: none-$11,999; 17-33: $12,000-$21,999; 34-67: $22,000-$49,999; 68-95: $50,000$104,999; 96-100: $105,000+
2000: 1-16: none-$14,999; 17-33: $15,000-$34,999; 34-67: $35,000-$64,999; 68-95: $65,000$124,999; 96-100: $125,000+
2004: 1-16: none-$14,999; 17-33: $15,000-$34,999; 34-67: $35,000-$69,999; 68-95: $65,000$119,000; 96-100: $120,000+
1992: x?=22.061, df=4, p<.001
1 99 6 := 1 6.9 89 , df=4, p<.001
2000: / =18.040, df=4, p<.001
2004: xz=12.402, df=4, p<.01
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

In looking at voting behavior and income, the results reveal multiple
instances of gains and losses for Democrats and Republican candidates over the
study period. Overall, candidates from both parties experienced a net gain in
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votes from the least wealthy Catholics. The most wealthy Catholics shifted their
support over the study period from Democrat to Republican candidates. The
relationship between voting behavior and income for Catholics was significant
every year.
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Table 5
Catholic Voting Behavior and Income Levels 1992-2004
Democrat

Republican

(N=)

1-16 percentile
17-33 percentile
34-67 percentile
68-95 percentile
96-100 percentile

64%
71%
72%
50%
55%

36%
30%
28%
50%
45%

(28)
(44)
(106)
(104)
(20)

1-16 percentile
17-33 percentile
34-67 percentile
68-95 percentile
96-100 percentile

78%
67%
63%
51%
48%

22%
33%
39%
49%
52%

(23)
(33)
(95)
(82)
(21)

1-16 percentile
17-33 percentile
34-67 percentile
68-95 percentile
96-100 percentile

69%
57%
50%
51%
26%

31%
43%
50%
49%
74%

(29)
(56)
(70)
(93)
(19)

1-16 percentile
17-33 percentile
34-67 percentile
68-95 percentile
96-100 percentile

55%
71%
60%
43%
33%

45%
29%
40%
57%
67%

(20)
(24)
(55)
(58)
(21)

1992

1996

2000

2004

1992: X2=12.425, df=4, p<005
1996: x 2= 8 . 164, df=4, p<05
2000: x2=9.152, df=4, p<05
2004:^=9.663, df=4, p<.01
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Region
The relationship between Catholic voting behavior and region was
significant only in 1992 and 2000. Catholics in the Northeast and the South were
more likely to vote for a Republican candidate in 2004 than they were in 1992.
Since 1992, support from Northeast Catholics has shifted from the Democratic to
Republican candidates, which is important considering the Northeast is consider
the high number of Catholics residing in the region. Support for Democratic
candidates also has weakened in the West. In 1992, 74 percent of Catholics in
the West voted for Clinton; in 2004, just 51 percents supported Kerry. The only
region that has not experienced substantial change regarding Catholic voting
behavior is the North Central United States.
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Table 6
Catholic Voting Behavior and Region 1992-2004
Democrat

Republican

(N=)

Northeast
North Central
South
West

69%
52%
60%
74%

32%
48%
40%
26%

(114)
(104)
(60)
(49)

Northeast
North Central
South
West

65%
54%
58%
64%

35%
46%
42%
36%

(74)
(93)
(62)
(47)

Northeast
North Central
South
West

51%
53%
33%
65%

49%
47%
67%
35%

(91)
(106)
(66)
(57)

Northeast
North Central
South
West

54%
53%
41%
51%

46%
47%
59%
49%

(56)
(70)
(32)
(39)

1996

2000

2004

1992:^=9.332, df=3, p <05
1996: x2=2.570, df=3, not significant
2000:x*=12.742, df=3, p<01
2004: ^ = 1.620, df=3, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

59

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

Hispanic Voters
Hispanic voters are much more likely to be Catholics than non-Catholics.
These results were significant every year. The percentage of Catholics who are
Hispanic has been relatively stable over the four election cycles, averaging 18
percent. In comparison, the percentage of non-Catholic Hispanics has averaged
about 5 percent over the same period. In addition, about half of the Hispanics
surveyed identified themselves as Catholic.

Table 7
Hispanic Catholic and Non-Catholic Voters: 1992-2004
1992

1996

2000

2004

Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
(N=)

21%
79%
(577)

18%
82%
(425)

16%
84%
(458)

18%
82%
(291)

Hispanic
Non-Hispanic
(N=)

5%
94%
(1884)

5%
95%
(1285)

4%
96%
(1333)

7%
93%
(905)

Catholics

Non-Catholics

1992: J=125.456, df=1, p<001
1996:^=66.068, df=1, p<001
2000: x2=69.596, df=1, p<.001
2004:^=32.774, df=1, p<001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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However, these results were significant only in 1992 and 1996 when
Hispanics and non-Hispanic Catholics exhibited different voting behavior, with
Hispanic Catholics overwhelmingly supporting Democratic candidates. The
relationship between Hispanic identification and voting behavior for Catholics
declined in significance over the study period, with it being significant in 1992 and
1996 and not significant in 2000 and 2004.

Table 8
Catholic Hispanic and Non-Hispanic Vote for Major Party Candidates:
1992-2004
1992

1996

2000

2004

Democrat
Republican
(N=)

75%
25%
(52)

86%
14%
(43)

63%
37%
(32)

55%
45%
(22)

Democrat
Republican
(N=)

60%
40%
(274)

55%
45%
(233)

49%
51%
(286)

51%
49%
(174)

Hispanic

Non-Hispanic

1992: x2=4.077, df=1, p<05
1996:^=14.976, df=1, p<001
2000: x 2= 2 . 113, df=1, not significant
2004: x2=.123, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Evaluating the Culture Wars Thesis
Church Attendance
Since 1992, Catholics church attendance has declined significantly.
Despite the drop in attendance, Catholics still go to church more often than nonCatholics. However, by 2000, those percentages were moving close to each
other, indicating that Catholics were becoming more similar to other religions
regarding how often they practiced their faith. And while the relationship between
religion and church attendance was significant every year, it declined in
significance in 2004.
Table 9
Catholic and Non-Catholic Church Attendance: 1992-2004

Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a
Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)

1992

1996

2000

2004

34%
12%

32%
15%

28%
15%

27%
12%

14%

16%

17%

19%

18%
22%
100%
(580)

18%
19%
100%
(425)

18%
22%
100%
(460)

16%
27%
100%
(291)

25%
10%

24%
11%

26%
10%

23%
12%

14%

14%

14%

14%

14%
37%
100%
(1892)

18%
33%
100%
(1280)

15%
34%
100%
(1329)

15%
36%
100%
(913)

Non-Catholics
Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a
Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)
1992: y?=52.590, df=4, p<001
1996: f =35.272, df=4, p<.001
2000: y?=28.113, df=4, p<001
2004: x2=10.443, df=4, p<.05
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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More church-going Catholics have shifted their voting behavior from 1992
to 2004 to voting for more conservative candidates. At the same time, however,
even less religious Catholics appear to be moving toward Republican candidates,
including in 2000 when half of “secular” Catholics voted for Bush. The
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior was significant
every year except 2000.
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Table 10
Catholic Voting Behavior and Church Attendance: 1992-2004
Democrat

Republican

56%
49%
65%
59%
84%
100%
(204)

44%
51%
35%
41%
16%
100%
(123)

50%
59%
72%
63%
68%
100%
(164)

50%
41%
28%
37%
32%
100%
(112)

48%
47%
54%
57%
50%
100%
(161)

53%
53%
46%
43%
50%
100%
(159)

43%
54%
25%
70%
64%
100%
(100)

57%
46%
75%
30%
36%
100%
(97)

1992
Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)
1996
Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)
2000

Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)
2004
Every Week
Almost Every Week
Once or Twice a Month
Few Times a Year
Never
(N=)
1992: f = 1 9.027, df=4, p<.001
1996: x2=7.891, df=4, p<.05
2000: x2=1.768, df=4, not significant
2004: x2=17.408, df=4, p<001

(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Single-Issue Voters
Abortion
Catholics have become more conservative in their views on abortion since
1992, and are slightly more conservative on the issue than non-Catholics, who
also have become more conservative on the issue since 1992. However, the
relationship between abortion and voters in general was significant only in 2000.

Table 11
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Abortion : 1992-2004
1992

1996

2000

2004

12%
30%

13%
32%

9%
34%

14%
34%

25%

18%

16%

18%

43%
(316)

38%
(272)

41%
(309)

34%
(192)

10%
28%

12%
29%

13%
28%

13%
31%

14%

16%

15%

18%

48%
(1006)

44%
(742)

44%
(783)

38%
(604)

Catholics
Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
and Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always
(N=)
Non-Catholics
Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
and Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always
(N=)
1992: x2=4.546, df=3, not significant
1996: X*=4.991, df=3, not significant
2000: =8.069, df=3, p<05.
2004: x2= 1.355, df=3, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Conservative and liberal Catholics had become polarized on the issue by 2004,
with those favoring the strongest abortion restrictions supporting the Republican
candidate and those favoring little or no abortion restrictions supporting the
Democratic candidate. For Catholics, the relationship between abortion and
voting behavior was significant for every year.

Table 12
Catholic Voting Behavior and Abortion: 1992-2004
Democrat

Republican

(N=)

Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and
Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always

58%
49%
58%

42%
51%
42%

(33)
(93)
(48)

76%

24%

(142)

Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and
Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always

51%
50%
59%

49%
50%
41%

(37)
(92)
(49)

71%

29%

(94)

Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and
Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always

39%
45%
38%

61%
55%
69%

(28)
(109)
(55)

62%

38%

(117)

Never Permitted By Law
By Law, Only in Case of Rape
By Law, Only in Case of Rape and
Woman’s Life in Danger
By Law, Always

31%
37%
61%

69%
63%
39%

(26)
(62)
(38)

65%

35%

(66)

1992

1996

2000

2004

1992: S =18.641, df=3, p<.001
1996: ^=9.843, df=3, p<01
2000: x2=12.653, df=3, p<.01
2004: x*=15.701, df=3, p<001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Gav Rights
Catholics are more likely to support gays serving in the military than nonCatholics. The results were significant for every year except 2004.

Table 13
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Whether
Gays Should Serve in the Military
1992

1996

2000

2004

64%
36%
100%
(486)

76%
24%
100%
(375)

81%
19%
100%
(434)

84%
16%
100%
(256)

57%
43%
100%
(1646)

66%
34%
100%
(1108)

74%
26%
100%
(1265)

80%
20%
100%
(770)

Catholics
Agree
Disagree
(N=)
Non-Catholics
Agree
Disagree
(N=)
1992: /= 7.0 2 2, df=1, p<05
1996:^=12.324, df=1, p<001
2000: y?=7.946, df=1, p<.01
2004: x2=1.292, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

In addition, Catholics have become less polarized on the issue and by
2004, a substantial majority of those who voted for the Democratic and
Republican candidates supported gays serving in the military. The relationship
between voting behavior and gays serving in the military was significant every
year, although it declined slightly in 2004.
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Table 14
Catholic Voting Behavior and Views on Whether
Gays Should Serve in the Military
Democrat

Republican

77%
23%
100%
(197)

47%
53%
100%
(113)

86%
14%
100%
(161)

64%
36%
100%
(108)

89%
11%
100%
(153)

74%
26%
100%
(149)

89%
11%
100%
(97)

81%
19%
100%
(96)

1992
Agree
Disagree
(N=)
1996
Agree
Disagree
(N=)
2000

Agree
Disagree
(N=)
2004
Agree
Disagree
(N=)
1992: x2=29.346, df=1, p<001
1996: x2=18.574, df=1, p<.001
2000: x*=71.340, df=1, p<.001
2004: x2=2.075, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Likewise, Catholics are more likely to support laws that protect gays from
job discrimination than non-Catholics. The results were significant for every year.

Table 15
Catholic and Non-Catholic Views on Whether There Should Be Laws
Protecting Gays Against Job Discrimination

Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)

1992

1996

2000

2004

68%
32%
100%
(490)

72%
28%
100%
(358)

74%
26%
100%
(380)

82%
18%
100%
(254)

58%
42%
100%
(1649)

61%
39%
100%
(1080)

65%
35%
100%
(1093)

73%
27%
100%
(771)

Non-Catholics
Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)
1992: ^-17.144, df=1, p<001
1996: x*=13.047, df=1, p<001
2000: x*=10.770, df=1, p<001
2004: x2=8.593, df=1, p <05
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

And like the results regarding Catholic voting behavior and gays serving in
the military, by 2004, Catholics were the least polarized on the issue of protecting
gays against job discrimination, regardless of party. A substantial majority of
Catholics who voted for the Democratic and Republican candidates supported
such laws. The relationship between Catholic voting behavior and views on
protection of gays against job discriminations was significant for every year
except 2004.
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Table 16
Catholic Voting Behavior and Views on Whether There Should Be Laws
Protecting Gays Against Job Discrimination
Democrat

Republican

77%
23%
100%
(196)

59%
41%
100%
(116)

79%
21%
100%
(160)

59%
41%
100%
(103)

84%
16%
100%
(154)

64%
36%
100%
(150)

86%
14%
100%
(97)

83%
17%
100%
(94)

1992
Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)
1996
Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)
2000
Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)
2004
Favor Laws
Oppose Laws
(N=)
1992:^=11.093, df=1, p<001
1996: x2=12.483, df=1, p<001
2000: x2=16.604, df=1, p<001
2004: )?=.242, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

Catholics As Swing Voters
Catholics are more likely to vote like non-Catholics than stand apart as
swing voters. In three of the four elections cycles, the swing voter variable for
Catholics was not significant. More importantly, Catholics appear to have more in
common with non-Catholics as a whole regarding how they vote than ever
before. Like the rest of the electorate, Catholics today are split 50-50 on who they
support for president and appear to shift their support for candidates from
election year to election year depending on the current political, cultural and
economic issues. The results of this analysis support this conclusion and allow
for a rejection of the hypothesis that Catholics are swing voters.
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Graph 1
Catholic and Non-Catholic Swing Voters: 1 9 9 2 -2 0 0 4
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S w ing V o te rs By Y e a r

Independent Sample
1992: x 2= 7. 161, df=1, not significant
1996: x2-.452, df=1, not significant
2000:^=3.035, df=1, p<.05
2004: x2—.173, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

The Ethnoreligious Model
Education
In looking at ethnoreligious factors, traditional ethnoreligious ties to the
Democratic Party appear to have weakened since 1992. Catholics and nonCatholics are experiencing similar trends regarding voting behavior and higher

levels of education. In 1992, 51 percent of Catholics had attended college, with
half earning a degree. In comparison, 46 percent of non-Catholics had attended
college or obtained a degree. By 2004, Catholics who had attended college or
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earned a degree increased to 60 percent, with 62 percent of non-Catholics doing
the same.
The majority of the least educated Catholics - those with a high school
diploma or less - still fall in line with traditional ethnoreligious trends of voting for
Democratic presidential candidates. However, these numbers have been
declining since the percentage of Catholics with lower levels of education has
been decreasing. While it appears Democratic candidates have been making
huge gains in attracting the least educated Catholics (those with just a grade
school education), in real numbers, the percentage of voters in that group has
dropped substantially. For example, in 1992, those with only a grade school
education represented 6 percent of Catholic voters; by 2004, they represented
just 1 percent. The 2004 statistic of 100 percent represents the two Catholic
voters with a grade school education, who voted for John Kerry.
At the same time, the percentage of most educated Catholics (those with
a college degree) has been increasing. In 1992, 32 percent of Catholic voters
had a college degree; by 2004, 42 percent of Catholic voters had a college
degree. This appears to be a boon for Republicans, who have been slightly more
successful in gaining support from this growing group of Catholic voters. Those
who have attended college but didn’t complete a degree have been swinging
their majority votes between the two parties, and with the majority voting for the
Democratic candidate in 2004. This group of voters as a percentage of all
Catholic voters has been stable over the four election cycles, not changing more
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Graph 2
Catholic Voting Behavior of High School Graduates

■ Democrat
U Republican

1992

1996

2000

2004

Year

Independent Sample
1992: =10.182, df=3, p<.01
1996: =16.568, df=3, p<.001
2000: x2=3. 709, df=3, not significant
2004: x2=3.130, df=3, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Graph 3
Catholic Voting Behavior of College Graduates

■ Democrat
■ Republican

1992

1996

2000

2004

Year

Independent Sample
1992:^=10.182, df=3, p<.01
1996:^=16.568, df=3, p<.001
2000: x2=3. 709, df=3, not significant
2004: x 2= 3 . 130, df=3, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

than a one to two percentage points each year. They now account for 25 percent
of Catholic voters, the smallest percentage for the group of the four election
years. In addition, by 2004 high school graduates had essentially split their votes
between Democratic and Republican candidates. High school graduates
represent the second largest group of Catholic voters (32 percent in 2004) so
attracting the votes of this group is critical for candidates.
In general, Catholic voters at all educational levels (except for those who
had completed just grade school) were essentially split 50-50 by 2004 on their
choice for president. These results indicate that Catholics appear to have moved
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away from their traditional ethnoreligious ties to the Democratic Party and are
more likely to vote in patterns similar to the electorate at large, which in 2000 and
2004 had split its votes between the candidates of the two major parties. The
relationship between education and voting behavior was significant only in 1992
and 1996.
Income
Catholics and non-Catholics are exhibiting similar trends regarding income
levels, trending together over the four election periods. In 1992, 43 percent of
Catholics and 42 percent of non-Catholics had an income level at the 68
percentile or greater. By 2004, that had dropped to 35 percent for Catholics and
37 percent for non-Catholics.
Although candidates from both parties gained votes from the least wealthy
Catholics over the study period, by 2004 there was an apparent split based
income, with wealthier Catholics voting for the Republican candidate and less
wealthier Catholics supporting the Democratic candidate. Only in 1992 did the
Democratic candidate attract a majority of the most wealthy Catholics (incomes
above $120,000). By 2000 74 percent of the wealthiest Catholics voted for
Republican George W. Bush. Democrat Bob Kerry regained some support from
the most wealthy Catholics in 2004, but Bush still appeared to be the pick of top
earners with 67 percent voting for him. Even among the 31 percent of middle and
upper income Catholics who earned between $65,000 and $119,000, Bush was
the favored candidate. The majority of Catholics with incomes less than $65,000
preferred the Democratic candidate. The results of the multivariate analyses
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further support the conclusion that the most wealthy Catholics prefer the
Republican candidate; in both 2000 and 2004 years, the relationship was
significant.
Other Ethnoreligious Factors
In addition to looking at education and income, this study evaluated the
relationship between Hispanic Catholics and voting behavior, as well as regional
distinctions and voting behavior.
Hispanic voters are much more likely to be Catholics than non-Catholics.
These results were significant every year. The percentage of Catholics who are
Hispanic has been relatively stable over the four election cycles, averaging 18
percent. In comparison, the percentage of non-Catholic Hispanics has averaged
about 5 percent over the same period. In addition, about half of the Hispanics
surveyed identified themselves as Catholic.
While Hispanic Catholics are more likely to vote for the Democratic
presidential candidate than non-Hispanic Catholics, they have been gradually
withdrawing their support for Democratic candidates since 1992. The high water
mark of the period for Catholic Hispanic support of a Democratic presidential
candidate was in 1996, when 86 percent of Hispanic Catholics voted for Bill
Clinton.
Republican George W. Bush heavily lobbied for the Latino vote in 2000
and 2004. It’s not a surprise that by 2004, voting trends for Hispanic and nonHispanic Catholics very similar, with a near split in the votes for candidates of
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each party. However, the results were significant only in 1992 and 1996 when
Hispanic Catholics overwhelmingly supporting Democratic candidates.
Graph 4
Hispanic Catholic Voting Trends
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Independent Sample
1992:^=4.077, df=1, p<.05
1996: =14.976, df=1, p<.001
2000: y?=2.113, df=1, not significant
2004: x2=. 123, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

Given the high percentage of Hispanics who are Catholics, an assessment
of Hispanic Catholic voting behavior is an opportunity for further study.
Region
Regarding the regional variables, it appears that Southern Catholics are
the most likely to support Republican candidates. The relationship between
voting behavior and living in the South was highly significant in 2000. What is
remarkable about 2000 is the dramatic shift in the Southern Catholic vote,
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increasing 25 percentage points from 1996. This may reflect the national debates
about moral character following the Lewinsky scandal that consumed the country
at the time. Out of all Catholics in the regions, Southern Catholics were the only
ones to vote in the majority at any point during the study period for a Republican
candidate, doing so in 2000 and 2004.
Although the relationship between voting behavior and the variables for
the Northeast and West were not significant at any point during the study period,
it appears that Northeast and Western Catholics have experienced a shift over
the study period toward supporting Republican candidates. Northeast Catholics,
who represent an epicenter of Catholics in America, increased their support for
Republican candidates by 14 percentage points from 1992 to 2004, and in 2000
nearly split their votes evenly between the Democratic and Republican
candidates. In the West, Republican support from Catholics increased 23
percentage points over the period, and in 2004, essentially split their votes
between Bush and Kerry. Interestingly, the debate over gay marriage took center
stage in the Northeast (Massachusetts) and the West (San Francisco) in
advance of the 2004 presidential election. If cultural issues are influencing the
Catholic vote, the gay marriage debate in these two regions may have had some
bearing on the increase in support for the Republican candidate from Catholics in
the Northeast and West. The only other significant regional variable was for
Catholic voters in the North Central states in 1992, who were slightly more likely
to support the Republican candidate that year. The North Central states include
significant population centers of Catholics in Chicago and Pennsylvania.
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However, voting behavior of Catholics living in the North Central region was
relatively unchanged and relatively split between the Democratic and Republican
candidates over the study period.
In evaluating the ethnoreligious model, it appears Catholics, as a class,
have shifted from one of less educated, less affluent blue collar workers who
support Democratic candidates to one of more educated, more affluent
professionals who have shifted away from their strong support for Democrats.
Given the significant relationship regarding the education and income variables
measuring aspects of class and voting behavior, class politics still appear to be
an important factor in voting behavior. These results are supported by studies of
realignments of class politics in Western European democracies, which have
concluded that “unskilled workers have become less distinctive in their partisan
alignments over time, but other classes have experienced offsetting changes,
yielding little evidence of a universal decline in the class cleavage.”183 Therefore,
I am rejecting the hypothesis that Catholics have experienced a decline factors
influencing in the ethnoreligious model.
The Culture Wars Thesis
In evaluating the culture wars thesis, the results of the analysis indicate
that the relationship between church attendance and voting behavior for
Catholics was significant every year except 2000. Understanding Catholic
Church attendance trends is important because according to the culture wars
thesis, people who attend church more often tend to vote for Republican
183 Brooks, Clem, Nieuwbeertab, Paul, and Manza, Jeff, “Cleavage-based voting behavior in
cross-national perspective: Evidence from six postwar democracies,” Social Science Research,
35, 2006, p. 89.
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candidates. In the case of Catholic voting behavior, the culture wars thesis
appears to be valid.
Catholics appear to attend church more often than non-Catholics;
however, Catholic attendance at Mass appears to be declining. In 1992, 46
percent of Catholic attended Mass every week or nearly every week; by 2004,
that number had dropped to 39 percent. In comparison, the percentage of
church-going non-Catholics was stable over the study period at 35 percent. In
addition, Catholics who said they never attend Mass increased from 22 percent
to 27 percent from 1992 to 2004. At the same time, the percentage of secular
non-Catholics was relatively unchanged over the period and stood at 36 percent
in 2004.
Despite the drop in attendance, Catholics still go to church more often
than non-Catholics. This could be a boon for Republican candidates, since
Catholics who attend church more often overall have shifted their voting behavior
from 1992 to 2004 to voting for more conservative candidates. Even less
religious Catholics appear to be moving toward Republican candidates.
Until 2000, more church-going Catholics tended to vote for Democratic
presidential candidates. Clinton received more support from Catholics who
attended church every week in 1992, than did Bush. By 1996, the Democrats
made substantial gains with moderately religious voters - those who occasionally
attended services or did so nearly every week. Though the most religious
Catholics had split their votes equally between the Democratic and Republican
candidates, both parties increased their percentage of votes from those who
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attended Mass every week. Clinton made substantial gains among less religious
voters at all levels, including a 10 percentage-point gain among those who are in
the pews nearly every week over 1992.
However in 2000, church-going Catholics appeared to slightly shift in a
more conservative direction, with 53 percent voting for the Republican candidate.
Those who attended church nearly every week experienced a more substantial
shift toward the Republican candidate; 53 percent voted for Bush in 2000,
compared to 41 percent who voted for Dole in 1996. In addition, Republicans
made substantial gains with voters who attend church less often. Perhaps most
surprising is that non-church going “secular” Catholics who traditionally favor
Democratic candidates split their votes between the Democratic and Republican
candidates.
By 2004, a majority of Catholic voters who attended Mass more often
were voting for Republican candidates and those attending Mass less often or
not at all were voting for Democratic candidates. Of those who attended Mass
every week, 57 percent voted for Bush. The Democrats made up ground with
those who attended Mass nearly every week, but lost a huge portion - 29
percentage points - of Catholics who went to Mass once or twice a month.
Catholics who rarely or never attended Mass, however, overwhelmingly voted for
Democrat Bob Kerry. The same was true overall for 2000, although the gap
between more and less religious voters was not as wide. This phenomenon may
indicate that Catholics are being affected by cultural issues that are influencing
more conservative, church-going Catholics to support Republican candidates and
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Graph 5
Voting Behavior of Catholics Who Attend Mass Every Week
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Independent Sample
1992:^=19.027, df=4, p<.001
1996:^=7.891, df=4, p<.05
2000: )f= 1 .768, df=4, not significant
2 0 0 4 := 1 7 .4 0 8 , df=4, p<.001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

more liberal, less church-going Catholics to vote for Democratic candidates.
It appears that cultural issues are influencing Catholics voting behavior.
The relationship between church attendance and abortion was highly significant
every year, with those who attend church more often having the most restrictive
views on abortion. At the same time, there were highly significant relationships
regarding voting behavior for the variables measuring two polarizing cultural
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Graph 6
V oting Behavior o f Catholics W ho
A ttend Mass a Few Tim es a Year
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Independent Sample
1992:^=19.027, df=4, p<.001
1996:^=7.891, df=4, p<.05
2000:^=1.768, df=4, not significant
2004:^=17.408, df=4, p<.001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

issues - abortion and gay rights. Given that the analysis indicated a significant
relationship between church attendance and voting behavior, and that church
attendance is an extremely strong predictor of views on abortion, I can conclude
that the culture wars thesis strongly influences Catholic voting behavior and
reject the null hypothesis that cultural issues are not influencing Catholic voters.
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Single-Issue Voters
Abortion
The variables used to measure whether Catholics appear to be single
issue voters on highly debated cultural issues, abortion and gay rights, were
highly significant during nearly every election cycle for candidates of both parties.
Catholics who supported Democratic candidates hold more liberal views on both
issues, and Catholics who supported Republican candidates hold more
conservative views on both issues.
Graph 7
Catholic Voters W ho Never Support Abortion
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Independent Sample
1992:^=18.641, df=3, p<.001
1996:^=9.843, df=3, p<.01
2000:^=12.653, df=3, p<.01
2004:^=15.701, df=3, p<.001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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Graph 8
Catholic Voters Who Always Support Abortion
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1992: x2=18.641, df=3, p<.001
1996:^=9.843, df=3, p<.01
2000:^=12.653, df=3, p<.01
2004:^=15.701, df=3, p<.001
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

Overall, Catholics have become more conservative in their views on
abortion since 1992. In 1992, 42 percent of Catholics held the most restrictive
views on the issue, believing that abortion should be illegal or only permitted in
the case of rape. By 2004, that number had increased to 48 percent. Even those
who made exceptions for rape and when a woman’s life was in danger
decreased 7 percentage points from 25 percent in 1992 to 18 percent in 2004. At
the same time, the percentage of Catholics who believe abortion should be
allowed in all situations dropped 9 percent from 43 percent to 34 percent.
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In addition, a comparison of Catholic voting behavior and views on
abortion shows a clear and growing divide between those who hold more
traditional, conservative Catholic views on abortion and those who hold more
liberal views on abortion. In 1992, the Democratic candidate drew 58 percent of
the voters who thought abortion should be illegal. By 2004, that percentage had
plummeted to 31 percent. At the same time, Republican candidates nearly
doubled their support from this group, with 42 percent of those who believed
abortion should be illegal voting for the Republican candidate in 1992 and 69
percent voting for the GOP in 2004. Although Republican candidates gained
some support from Catholics who held more liberal views on the legality of
abortion, by 2004 there was a clear split: those holding conservative views on
abortion preferred Republican candidates and those holding liberal views on
abortion preferred Democratic candidates. In the analysis, the relationship
between abortion and voting behavior was significant for every year.
The results reinforce the conclusion that Catholics who voted for
Republican candidates tended to be more conservative regarding under what
circumstances abortion should be legal, if at all. By 2004, they were the most
polarized on the issue, with those favoring the strongest abortion restrictions
favoring Republican candidates and those favoring wider access to abortion
favoring Democratic candidates.
Interestingly, Catholics’ views on abortion appear in sync with other
denominations, which also have shifted to favor more restrictive measures
regarding the procedure. In 1992, 38 percent of non-Catholics held the most
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restrictive views on abortion; by 2004, that number had increased to 44 percent.
In addition, the percentage of non-Catholics who believed abortion should be
legal without restriction dropped 10 percentage points from 48 in 1992 to 38
percent in 2004. While the percentage of Catholics who held more restrictive
views on abortion is slightly higher than non-Catholics, their views were shifting
in the same direction as non-Catholics. This indicates that cultural issues may be
impacting the views of the entire electorate, including Catholics. Had Catholics
held substantially different views about abortion in comparison to non-Catholics,
one could hypothesize that the teachings of the Catholic Church may be
influencing Catholic voters. While the Catholic Church’s views on abortion may
influence Catholics to some extent (given that they, in general, hold more
restrictive beliefs on abortion than non-Catholics), it appears that the issue of
abortion is a cultural issue that is dividing Americans of all faiths.
Gay Rights
Catholics have become more supportive of certain gay rights over the
study period. They consistently were more supportive of gays serving in the
military and job protection of gays than non-Catholics every year of the study
period. In addition, Catholics who supported these gay rights tended to vote for
Democratic candidates, although the relationship declined in significance over
the study period until it was no longer significant in 2004.
Regarding gays serving the military, Catholic support increased from 64
percent in 1992 to 84 percent in 2004. In comparison, non-Catholic support for
gay military service increased from 57 percent in 1992 to 80 percent in 2004.
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Graph 9
Catholic V o ters W ho A gree W ith Gays Serving in th e M ilitary
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1996: =18.574, df=1, p<.001
2000:^=11.340, df=1, p<.001
2004: x2=2.075, df=1, not significant
(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)

Over the study period, Catholics were more supportive of gays serving in the
military than non-Catholics, and by 2004, the two groups were more in
agreement on the issue than at any other point in the study period. By 2004, the
relationship between Catholic voting behavior and gay military service was no
longer significant.
In addition, Catholics who strongly supported gays serving in the military
tended to vote for Democratic candidates. In 1992, there was a clear division
based on voter choice, with 77 percent of Catholics who voted for the Democratic
candidate supporting gay military service, compared to 47 percent of Catholic
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who voted for the Republican candidate. By 2004, however, large majorities of
Catholics who supported candidates of both parties also supported gays serving
the military.
On the issue of support for laws that protect gays from job discrimination,
Catholics are more likely to support such laws than non-Catholics. The results
were significant for every year. In 1992, 68 percent of Catholics favored such
laws, compared to 58 percent of non-Catholics. By 2004, 82 percent of Catholics
believed gays should be protected from job discrimination, compared to 73
percent of non-Catholics.
Graph 10
Catholic Voters W ho Favor Laws
Protecting Gays A gainst Job Discrim ination
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(Significance based on 1-sided t-test.)
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In addition, Catholics who supported laws protecting gays from
discrimination tended to vote for Democratic candidates. This relationship was
significant every year except 2004. And like the results regarding Catholic voting
behavior and gays serving in the military, by 2004, Catholics were the least
polarized on the issue of protecting gays against job discrimination, regardless of
party. A substantial majority of Catholics who voted for the Democratic and
Republican candidates - 86 percent of Democratic voters and 83 percent of
Republican voters — supported such laws.
Finally, although the issue of whether gays should be able to adopt
children was measured only in 1992, 2000 and 2004, the results indicate a highly
significant relationship every year with voting behavior. In addition, both liberal
and conservative Catholics have experienced a shift in their views on gay
adoption, becoming more supportive of it. In 1992, 40 percent of those who voted
for the Democratic candidate and 19 percent of those who voted for the
Republican candidate supported gay adoption; by 2004 those numbers had
increased to 68 percent of Democratic voters and 45 percent of Republican
voters. It appears that Catholics are becoming more supportive of gay adoption
as they have become more supportive of other gay civil rights. Unfortunately,
data about views on gay marriage, which was called a wedge issue in the 2004
presidential election, was not available over the study period from the dataset
used. Given that the issue of traditional vs. non-traditional marriage has strong
religious overtones, further study of Catholic voting behavior and new gay civil
rights issues warrants close attention.
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The results of this analysis indicate that Catholics have strong tendencies
toward being single-issue voters on cultural issues, particularly regarding
abortion. Therefore, I can reject the null hypothesis that single issues, such as
abortion and gay rights, are not significantly influencing Catholic voters.
Final Thoughts
The results of this analysis confirm that Catholics voters are not swing
voters in American politics. They appear to be split 50-50 on who to vote for
president that is in keeping with voting trends across the nation. Although class
and cultural issues have significantly influenced Catholic voting behavior, they
also have significantly influenced non-Catholic voting behavior in similar ways.
While the “Catholic Vote” may once have been a significant factor in electoral
politics, today Catholics are more likely to vote like the rest of the country than
ever before.
Today’s Catholics are more educated and more affluent than their
ancestors, and these two factors appear to positively impact their support for
Republican candidates. Regional distinctions do not appear to play a substantial
role in Catholic voting behavior, although Southern Catholics are more likely to
vote for Republican candidates. In contrast, Hispanic Catholics are more likely to
vote for Democratic candidates, although that support has weakened
substantially since 1992. Given that Hispanics represent approximately 20
percent of all Catholics and that Hispanics are the largest and fastest growing
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minority in the United States184, trends regarding Hispanic Catholic voting
behavior merit further study.
On cultural matters, the abortion issue appears to be one of the most
polarizing for Catholics. Those who hold conservative views on abortion now
tend to favor Republican candidates and those with liberal views now appear to
prefer Democratic candidates. In addition, the relationship between Catholic
voting behavior and gay rights issues was significant for certain years during the
study period and indicated that Catholics with more liberal views about gay rights
voted for Democratic candidates, while conservative Catholics favored
Republican candidates. The results found there was a significant relationship
between church attendance and voting behavior in most years, with Catholics
who attend Mass more often tending to vote for conservative candidates and
those who attend less often favoring liberal Candidates. While the culture wars
thesis may be impacting Catholic voting behavior, Catholics also appear to have
strongly tendencies toward being single-issue voters.
The conclusion that Catholics are strongly influenced by a combination of
religious, cultural and class factors finds support in the academic community.
According to Kohut and his colleagues, “It is important not to overstate the impact
of religion on attitudes, party identification and voting behavior. Religion is only
one of many influences on political behavior: a ‘multiplicity of interests’ - which
James Madison viewed as one of the virtues of a large and diverse republic continue to hinder the development of large, unified factions based on religion or
any other single attribute. Nonetheless, among the many influences on attitudes,
184 U.S. Census Bureau Report, “The Hispanic Population: Census 2000 Brief,” May 2001, p. 1.
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partisanship, and votes, religion is nearly as important as demographic factors
such as gender, race, income, and education.”185
Achterberg has found similar results in his assessment of 20 Western
European democracies. He concluded that traditional issues of class are just as
relevant to voters as new cultural and environmental issues, in some instances,
more relevant. “All in all, in the new political cultures, the old politics of class have
come to share the stage with new issues.”186
Layman recognized this dilemma and suggested that scholars work to
develop a new model that factors in both religious and non-religious influencers
of voter behavior. “The model should account for the possibility that religious
commitment and doctrinal orthodoxy have effects on political attitudes and
partisan ties independent of religious tradition, just as the culture wars thesis
suggests. However, it also should account for political differences between
religious traditions and the possibility that the effects of beliefs and behaviors are
dependent on tradition, just at the ethnoreligious viewpoint contends.”187
Further study of Catholic voting behavior is particularly important in light of
the devastating priest sexual abuse scandal that continues to impact the church.
For many laity, it has shaken the very foundation of their faith. In the mid-1980s,
the first indications of widespread sexual abuse of children at the hands of the
clergy began to surface. The church eventually paid out millions to the victims,
but what was most unsettling to many American Catholics was the manner in

185 Kohut, Andrew, et. al., 2000, p. 124.
186 Achterberg, Peter, “Class Voting in the New Political Culture,” International Sociology, 21:2,
2006, pp. 254.
187 Layman, p. 68.
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which the church dealt with the issue internally. Instead of taking action to ensure
clergy who had preyed on young parishioners would never commit such acts
again, the laity learned that in many cases, the church knowingly moved abuser
priests to different parishes and engaged in a massive cover-up of priest abuse.
The Northeast, one of the epicenters of American Catholics, experienced some
of the most chilling incidents, including that of defrocked priest John Geoghan,
who was believed to have molested 150 children in his 30 years in a half a dozen
parishes in the Boston Archdiocese.188 “In the ensuing national uproar, there
were admissions of dozens of molestations and cover-ups across the country,
accompanied by the suspensions or resignations of more than 200 priests,
including at least four bishops.”189
For decades, within the U.S. Catholic Church, sexual misbehavior by
priests was shrouded in secrecy - at every level. Abusive priests —
Geoghan among them — often instructed traumatized youngsters to say
nothing about what had been done to them. Parents who learned of the
abuse, often wracked by shame, guilt, and denial, tried to forget what the
church had done. The few who complained were invariably urged to keep
silent. And pastors and bishops, meanwhile, viewed the abuse as a sin for
which priests could repent rather than as a compulsion they might be
unable to control.190
Since 1950, there have been an estimated 4,983 accused priests and
12,537 victims.191 By 2006, the total cost of the scandal to the church settlements, therapy for victims, attorneys fees - had exceeded $1.5 billion.192

188 “The Geoghan Case,” The Boston Globe, accessed online 2 May 2006, at
http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/geoghan/.
189 Reichley, p. 322.
190 “Church ailowed abuse by priest for years,” The Boston Globe, accessed online 2 May 2006,
at http://www.boston.com/globe/spotlight/abuse/stories/010602_geoghan.htm.
191 Ecksrom, Kevin, “Church Spending on Catholic Sex Abuse Scandal Tops $1 Billion," Religion
News Service, 30 March 2006. Access online 2 May 2006 via LexisNexis at http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=0a8df18a3442688bb3391d882a3e1028&_docnum=2&wchp=
dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=be1615cef794ee49e2dfc390d4889247.
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Many parishes still are struggling to achieve pre-scandal attendance
levels, but some are noting signs of a rebirth of the Catholic faith and a level
closure on the scandal. In the Boston Archdiocese, “though anger lingers, a
strong devotion to the Gospel, Catholic liturgy and doctrinal teachings appear to
have kept many Catholics rooted in their pews through difficult times.”193 This
may be due, in part, to the “deep staying power” and “enduring moral authority”
of the church; despite the scandal, many Catholics cannot imagine being
otherwise, and appear to have “glue that Protestants do not have.”194 According
to Davidson and Hoge, while the laity consider the priest sex-abuse scandal to
be the number one issue facing the church and a large portion (78 percent) are
ashamed and embarrassed for the church, overall the “majority of Catholics are
strongly committed to their faith - to the point that they remain loyal to the church
even in the midst of what many consider to be the worst crisis in U.S. church
history.”195
When Catholic immigrants first came to the New World, they thought of
themselves as Catholic Americans - Catholic first and American second. Over
the course of several generations, their views of themselves evolved to thinking
of themselves as American Catholics - American first and Catholic second. Kapp
explains these two conflicting beliefs as the communitarian creed and the

192 “Cost of Sexual Abuse Now Exceeds $1.5 Billion,” America, 194:15, 24 April 2006, p. 7.
193
Hovanasian, Debbie, “Catholics were tested by a sex-abuse scandal and church closings.
Now the faithful are seeing signs of renewal,” Lowell Sun, 16 April 2006, accessed online via
LexisNexis at http://web.lexisnexis.com/universe/document?_m=0a8df18a3442688bb3391d882a3e1028&_docnum=6&wchp=
dGLbVzb-zSkVA&_md5=97c12aced 14f4e2765ac796d6d05efe8.
194 Reichley, p. 323.
195 Davidson, James D., and Hoge, Dean R., “Catholics After The Scandal,” Commonweal, 19
November 2004, p. 15.
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individualistic creed - one emphasizes Catholic communal teachings and the
other moral and/or economic individualism.196 While it appears that Catholics are
in sync with the individualistic creed and of the two creeds, consider themselves
American Catholics, perhaps they have moved even farther away from their
Catholic roots. Given that Catholics are trending in such similar ways as nonCatholics regarding who they choose for president, perhaps today’s Catholics,
when going to the polls, think if themselves as simply Americans.

196

Kapp, pp. 123-124.
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